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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Inflation, Currency Substitution and Dollarization:
The Case of Argentina
by
Eugenio J. Alemcn
Florida International University, 1995
Professor Jorge Salazar-Carrillo, Major Professor
This dissertation discusses the relationship between inflation, currency
substitution and dollarization that has taken place in Argentina for the past several
decades.
First, it is shown that when consumers are able to hold only domestic
monetary balances (without capital mobility) an increase in the rate of inflation will
produce a balance of payments deficit. We then look at the same issue but with
heterogeneous consumers, this heterogeneity being generated by non-proportional
lump-sum transfers.
Second, we discussed some necessary assumptions related to currency
substitution models and concluded that there was no a-priori conclusion on whether
vi
currencies should be assumed to be "cooperant" or "non-cooperant" in utility. That
is to say, whether individuals held different currencies together or one instead of the
other.
Third, we went into discussing the issue of currency substitution as being a
constraint on governments inflationary objectives rather than a choice of those
governments to avoid hyperinflations. We showed that imperfect substitutability
between currencies does not "reduce the scope for rational (hyper)inflationary
processes" as it had been previously argued. It will ultimately depend on the
parametrization used and not on the intrinsic characteristics of imperfect
substitutability between currencies.
We further showed that in Argentina, individuals have been able to
endogenize the money supply by holding foreign monetary balances. We argued
that the decision to hold foreign monetary balances by individuals is always a
second best due to the trade-off between holding foreign monetary balances and
consumption. For some levels of income, consumption, and foreign inflation,
individuals would prefer to hold domestic monetary balances rather than foreign
ones.
We then modeled the distinction between dollarization and currency
substitution. We concluded that although dollarization is necessary for currency
substitution to take place, the decision to use foreign monetary balances for
transactions purposes is largely independent from the dollarization process.
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Finally, we concluded that Argentina should not fully dollarize its economy
because dollarization is always a second best to using a domestic currency.
Further, we argued that a fixed exchange system would be better than a flexible
exchange rate or a "crawling-peg" system because of the characteristics of the
political system and the possibilities of "mass praetorianism" to develop, which is
intricately linked to "populist" solutions.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Argentina's history has been plagued by the mismanagement of its fiscal and
monetary policy. At the beginning of Argentina as a nation, in the early 1,800s, this
mismanagement came about as a reflection of the lack of integration and
institutionalization of its political system. During the middle and late 1900s the
country continued to suffer a lack of institutionalization of its political structure
complicated further with populists views on the future economic development of the
country.
1.1 AT THE START OF THE 20th- CENTURY
At the start of the 20th. century, so it has been said, Argentina was one of the most
promising countries in the Americas. Argentina was being compared to Canada and
Australia as one of the most promising countries. In fact, each time somebody talks
about Argentina's misfortunes, they all go back to the beginnings of the century to
talk about the "Argentine Miracle." However, a paragraph from Dornbusch (1995)
can clarify Argentina's position at the beginnings of this century, it reads:
"At the beginning of the century, Argentina was among the most prosperous
1
countries in the world. It is not true that Argentina had an income level equal
to that of the United States or the leading country, Britain--in fact, . . ,
Argentine per capita income was more nearly half the U.S. level. Argentina is
often compared to Australia--both are resource rich and were among the ten
most prosperous regions at the beginning of the century. Again Australia
already had almost twice the level of per capita income that Argentina
showed. Interestingly, Italy closely matched Argentina at the outset of the
century and in 1950." (Dornbusch 1995, p. 224)
We chose this paragraph from Dornbusch (1995) because it is a middle
ground between the views of the 'liberals' and the views of the opposition2 within
Argentina. The views of the 'liberals' were that Argentina, during the turn of the
century, was an 'economic (super?)power' or an 'economic miracle,'3 while the
opposition complained that Argentina's economy had created an extremely high
inequality in the distribution of income. In fact, Argentina's historical problems, we
argue, are due to the lack of political agreement on how to redistribute income and
'Conservative sector composed fundamentally of the rich land-owners. Their
economic power was based on land ownership. Of course, they were only liberals
with respect to economic freedom.
2Which is composed of the 'peronists' (peronists before Menem) and the 'left'
in general.
'This issues will be important latter on when we are going to compare those
times with these latest years.
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how to minimize income inequality.
Another paragraph, this time from Hyndman (1892), describes Argentina's
(or fundamentally Buenos Aires) situation at the turn of the century:4
"Buenos Aires surpassed every other city in its luxury, extravagance, and
wholesale squandering of wealth. There was literally no limit to the excesses
of the wealthier classes. While money, luxuries, and material poured in on the
one hand, crowds of immiserization from Italy and other countries flocked in
to perpetuate the prosperity of the new Eldorado of the South. Railways,
docks, tramways, waterworks, gas-works, public building, mansions, all were
being carried on at once in hot haste." (Hyndman 1892, p. 89)
This was the picture of Buenos Aires at the turn of the century in the eyes of
a foreigner. And it was not far from reality. However, this was not the biggest
problem. The biggest problem was that there was no agreement on how they
should distribute such wealth. The political system (i.e., the political institutions)
was extremely weak and inefficient. Universal voting was not guaranteed by the law
and it was not until the 1916 elections that "full"5 participation was granted to the
population. We say full participation because "voting was not only a right but also
4This paragraph was also quoted in Dornbusch 1995.
5This full participation was achieved by the Saenz-Pena law of 1912.
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an obligation," with jail terms for those who did not vote.
The year of 1916 marked the break-down in the traditional "elite" dominated
political system. However, they still maintained its economic dominance. That is to
say, the "liberals" were thrown out of the political power but maintaining their
economic handle over their political opposition, which out-numbered them on the
ballots as a consequence of the 'Ley Saenz-Pena' of 1912. In the year of 1930, the
disagreement between the political majority and the economic minority was such
that the political system collapsed and a military "coup d'etat"6 broke the
constitutional continuity of the democratic system.
The disagreement between the political and the economic sectors were
tremendous. The 1929 world crisis had an enormous negative effect over the
economic conditions of the traditional "elite." Dornbusch (1995) says that "the
Depression hit Argentina extra hard. Having built a fortune on a very open economy
oriented toward exports of agricultural commodities--wheat and beef--protection in
industrial countries and the collapse of world trade and prices had a devastating
impact. Even so, the country maintained its international credit by steadfast
adherence to debt service and internationalism." (Dornbusch 1995, p. 225)
From the 1930s to 1944 a succession of fraudulent elections limited full
participation in the political system to the rapidly growing native but mostly migrant
population. In 1945 Juan D. Per6n won the elections and followed a populist
60f course with the consent of the economic minority.
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economic program, which increased the participation of the government in the
economic arena, thus increasing the economic inefficiency of the government.'
Economic growth during the first decades of this century was high, although
the disparities between those who had and those who did not were widening
continuously. Yet why is it that nowadays the 'liberals' talk about the beginnings of
the century as an example to follow? The reason needs to be found not on this
inequality on the distribution of income but on the so called "Conversion Law of
1899."
What was the Conversion Law of 1899? Williams (1920) explains this law in
the following paragraph: "this law was the result of a project formulated by Finance
Minister J. M. Rosa, and supported by ex-President Pellegrini and the well-known
Argentine banker, Ernesto Tornquist. The plan was: (1) To fix a ratio according to
which redemption of paper money should be made in specie; (2) to accumulate a
metallic reserve sufficient to permit such redemption; (3) to maintain the ratio fixed
upon by adding to the Caja de Conversion a bureau to act as a regulator of the
currency, increasing or decreasing the amount of paper in circulation according to
the amount of gold deposited." (Williams 1920, p. 156)8
In his conclusions about the Conversion Law of 1899, Williams argues that
7However, this process had started just before the coup d'etat of 1930 with
the creation of Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales (YPF) under the command of
General Mosconi.
8ln 1991, the Ley de Convertivilidad (the Convertibility Law) was passed by
the Argentine Congress.
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"it may be pointed out that a prominent force in assuring the success of the
Conversion Law has been the succession of favorable balances of international
payments which Argentina has enjoyed. The increase of the gold reserve depends
directly on that circumstance, and the maintenance of the conversion system itself
depends upon the maintenance of that reserve. It is still conceivable that a
succession of unfavorable balances, prolonged over as long a period as that of the
favorable balances of the last twenty years, would, by draining of the gold reserve,
again raise the problem of paper currency. Under such difficult circumstances one
is permitted to wonder whether the specie in the Caja de Conversi6n would
continue to be regarded as an inviolable fund." (Williams 1920, p.161)
This argument has an enormous importance nowadays due to the trade
deficit suffered by Argentina during these last years.
He argued further that "it is interesting to conclude the consideration of this
problem of the relation between inconvertible paper money and the balance of
international payments with a quotation from Martinez and Lewandowski.9 In
commenting upon the conversion plan, they make reference to the criticisms made
in some quarters at the rapid increase in the paper money circulation since the law
went into operation, which has given rise to the cry that such large emissions may
even yet bring back the old problem of debased currency. The reply of these writers
9Martinez and Lewandowski, Argentina en el Siglo XX, p. 499. [Also quoted
by Williams (1920)]
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was as follows:
"But it is easy to understand that those alarms are not justified, from the
moment in which such emissions are guaranteed by a corresponding deposit in
gold in the Caja de Conversi6n. Besides, if one reflects a little, one cannot do less
than recognize that, the product of the surplus of the economic balance of the
country being every day more important, this surplus will have an influence on the
monetary situation, even though, instead of being conserved in the Caja de
Conversi6n, the surplus should be found in the strong boxes of the private banks."
"Evidently, a favorable balance of payments is recognized as a factor in
maintaining the value of the paper currency, . . . " (Williams 1920, p. 162)
1.2 AT THE START OF THE 21S- CENTURY
What has changed in Argentina during these last 100 years? We could probably
say that we are "recycling" history in favor of the old "elite." However, this is not so.
Nowadays is not the land-rich class who is the beneficiary of this so called new
"Argentine Miracle." The overvaluation of the currency is hurting their traditional
exports more than ever before. Furthermore, protectionist policies in some of the
biggest countries (or group of them such as NAFTA and the European Community)
are preventing Argentina's traditional exports to expand further. Nevertheless,
7
growth has been enormous since the application of the Convertibility Law in 1991.14
However, that does not mean that most of the population is benefiting from this
growth. In fact, income inequality is very high, and a further contributing factor is the
extreme" level of unemployment which has reached 12.2% at the beginning of
1995. The government argues that there is a process of adjustment from the layoffs
produced by the privatization of the government owned enterprises but that it will
get better in the future. Furthermore, the government passed a labor law through
the Argentine Congress which will try minimize the "Argentine cost" in the labor
market to make it more responsive to economic changes.12
Signs of this rising inequality are ever present in Buenos Aires and in the
rest of the country. By looking at some of the new investments taking place in
Buenos Aires, one wonders if we could rewrite again that paragraph from Hyndman
of his assessment of the situation of Buenos Aires at the beginning of the 2 0th
century: "Buenos Aires surpassed every other city in its luxury, extravagance, and
wholesale squandering of wealth. There (is?) was literally no limit to the excesses
of the wealthier classes. While money, luxuries, and material poured in on the one
hand, crowds of immiserization from..." the Province of Buenos Aires and from the
1OGDP has increase 33% in four years, from 1991-1994.
"Extreme for Argentine standards. In fact it is as high as it has ever been.
The underemployment rate is on or about 14% which puts the level of
unemployment and underemployment at a historic high of 26.2%.
12However, the latest figures on unemployment put this rate at 18.6 % on July
of 1995, twice as much as in 1994.
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rest of the country "...flocked in to perpetuate the prosperity of the new Eldorado of
the South." (Hyndman 1892, p. 89)
Nonetheless, many things have changed in Argentina during these 100
years, and two of the most important changes have been: first, the fact that the
political system has been opened completely. By this we mean that every sector in
society has at least the possibility of actively participating in it. No sector in society
has been banned from the political arena, as it used to be the case during almost
the entire previous 100 years.
Furthermore, the military sector, an active participant in the political arena
during the history of Argentina, has been successfully dismantled and deactivated
from any political responsibility and political participation. We say that it has been
dismantled and deactivated because its political power came from their economic
power, which was based on the ownership and administration of vital industrial
sectors of the Argentine economy."
Secondly, and probably for the first time in the history of Argentina, the
political power and the economic power seem to share the same views about the
new path toward development and growth. Even the political opposition agrees, at
least in principle, on what should not be done, which is to go back to the situation
that existed before 1991.
'Examples were Fabricaciones Militares, YPF, YCF, Comision de Energia
At6mica, the Steel Industry, etc., just to give some examples.
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To this respect, Carlos A. Rodriguez (1994a) argues the following: "The
significant changes experienced by Argentina after 1990 were a result of a genuine
desire on the part of authorities to promote structural adjustment, an attitude partly
induced by the debacle caused by hyperinflation. It is clear that after the adjustment
that has taken place, it is very unlikely that the economy will revert to its earlier
condition. The significant reduction in the size and role of the public sector is not
likely to be reversed, either." (Rodriguez 1994, p. 157)
However, this does not mean that populist solutions to income inequality are
totally out of the future of Argentina. The lack of integration of the political system,
together with the lack of a homogeneous growth across the country limits this
positive outlook for the future.
Argentina's high dependency on external, and exogenous variables, further
contributes to make the future development even more unstable. The recent
Mexican crisis, with what has been called the "tequila effect" over the Latin
American economies puts a serious question mark on this type of problems.
However, the potentiality of MERCOSUR14 and the still dubious, but nonetheless
possible, future participation of Argentina in the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), together with the GATT agreement will tend to minimize the
negative effects of the external sector over the Argentine economy.
"The South American Common Market, currently composed of Argentina,
Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay.
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The mismanagement of fiscal and fundamentally monetary policy on the part
of the Argentine government has given rise to a phenomenon called "currency
substitution." By successfully substituting away domestic monetary balances,
individuals have tried to evade the inflation tax imposed by this mismanagement of
monetary policy. This dissertation analyzes the issue of currency substitution in the
context of the Sidrauski model in which money is included in the utility function as
a provider of liquidity services.
The dissertation is divided as follows: Chapter 2 discusses some recent
historical developments with respect to macroeconomic policy and the use of the
money supply to finance huge government deficits. It also deals with a revision of
the most important factors and relations between variables affecting the economic
process. Some of the variables included are: Inflation Rate, Real M, as a
percentage of GDP, Fiscal Deficit as a percentage of GDP, Total Indebtedness and
Debt to GDP ratio, etc.
It is also an introduction to the idea of currency substitution and the
difference between currency substitution and financial adaptation. It gives reasons
why we think that currency substitution is an important factor to take into account
in the case of Argentina and, furthermore, the misconceptions about the use of the
term.
Chapter 3 is an introduction to the effects of an increase in the rate of
inflation on the alternatives of agents when there is no capital mobility. We use the
11
Sidrauski model with money in the utility function. Furthermore, agents are assumed
to have endogenous rates of time preference. Included also is an analysis of the
effects on agents of a non-proportional lump-sum transfer scheme. Several cases
are studied.
Chapter 4 is a discussion on the assumptions used in models that deal with
currency substitution. We are concerned in this chapter with the distinction between
cooperant and non-cooperant real monetary balances. It also serves as an
introduction to latter chapters on currency substitution.
Chapter 5 discusses several issues concerning the effects of inflation when
we have currency substitution together with the possibility of rational
hyperinflationary paths to develop. It is argued that for rational hyperinflations to be
possible, currencies cannot be essential in utility.
In Chapter 6 we introduce a new model of dollarization were the foreign
currency is accumulated through a balance of payments surplus and agents are not
lump-sum compensated for the opportunity cost of holding foreign real monetary
balances.
Chapter 7 extends the analysis of Chapter 6 in so far as it introduces
currency substitution into the picture to distinguish it from dollarization. An
alternative parametrization is used. This parametrization allows agent to
endogenize the effects of an increased rate of growth of domestic monetary
balances on the optimal decision of agents.
12
Chapter 8 is the conclusion and some policy recommendations in the case
of Argentina.
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CHAPTER 2
ARGENTINA: A RECENT HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
2.1 Inflation in Argentina
From 1945 to 1974 Argentina suffered a relatively low rate of inflation
(usually, two a digits figure)' compared with the inflation rate characteristic for the
period 1975 to 1991. The period 1975-1991 experienced several hyperinflationary
processes, or high inflation processes,2 that have contributed to the emergence of
a phenomenon called "currency substitution." Individual agents switched to a
foreign currency to avoid the effects of the inflation tax (or seigniorage) normally
collected by governments in order to minimize the increase in the opportunity cost
of holding real monetary balances. That is to say, as inflation increases, the
opportunity cost of holding real monetary balances increases as well, which
produces a shift away from that instrument in the portfolio of individuals. The
inflation rate during this second period never decreased below 100% per year.
'With several exceptions. In 1953 the inflation rate was 4.0; in 1954, 3.8; in
1959, 113.7; and in 1969, 7.6.
2There has been much discussion about the issue of what is considered to
be a hyperinflationary level of inflation. In general, Argentina's inflation rate has
been far from hyperinflationary.
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Figures 2.1a. and 2.1b. show these two periods of inflationary processes.
The graph has been divided (from 1945-1974 and from 1975-1994) to differentiate
both periods. Note that the vertical axe for Figure 2.1 a. goes up to 120 but the same
axe for Figure 2.1b. goes as high as 3,500!
Much has been written in the literature about the causes of these inflationary
processes. However, most of them boil down to Friedman's conclusion that
"inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon." That is to say, if the
government stops printing money, inflation must disappear.
What we will try to convey throughout this dissertation is that having a
domestic money is necessary, if not essential. It is useful to individuals and it is
useful for governments. In fact, money is an indispensable instrument in modern
economies, so dependent on trade. Without money, trade would be extremely
expensive, if not impossible. So, having a sound money should be one of the most
important objectives of any government. The problem faced by countries then is
defining the use of money to come up with an agreement on the amount of money
that is beneficial to everyone, which is not an easy task, especially for Less
Developed Countries (LDC's).
Table 2.1 shows the level of real monetary balances (M1), as a percentage
of GDP for Argentina during the period 1945-1994.
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Table 2.1
REAL M1 AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP
1945 31.1 1961 17.4 1977 7.3
1946 33.5 J[1962 13.7 111978 8.1
1947 32.5 11963 14.4 11979 11 7.7
11948 11 35.6 J[1964 15.5 111980 11 9.0
11949 36.9 11965 13.6 1981 11 6.2
11950 11 36.1 [1966 J 14.5 ]1982 5.8
11951 28.2 j[1967 14.9 111983 5.2
1952 27.9 1968 17.1 1984 3.8
1953 32.0 1969 16.3 1985 4.1
1954 32.7 1970 14.9 1986 5.8
[1955 32.7 l[1971 j[ 13.7 11987 J[ 5.2
1956 29.8 1972 11.3 1988 3.8
[1957 25.5 11973 I[ 15.9 11989 2.8
[1958 21.9 ]1974 11 17.2 J1990 2.5
1959 17.0 11975 11.5 1991 4.4
11960 II 18.9 1976 8.7 1992 7.5
Sources: The Political Economy of Argentina. 1946-83, Ed. by Guido Di Tella and Rudiger Dornbusch.
El Fortalecimiento Del Sector Financiero en el Proceso de Ajuste: Liberalizaci6n y Reaulaci6n,
Roberto Frenkel, Ed.
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Figure 2.2
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Dornbusch. El Fortalecimiento Del Sector Financiero en el Proceso de Ajuste: Liberalizaci6n Y
Requlaci6n, Roberto Frenkel, Ed.
Table 2.1, if nothing else, shows how individuals have been getting rid of domestic
currency holdings for the last five decades. Real monetary balances have
decreased from 36.9% of GDP in 1949 to 3.8% of GDP in 1984. One wonders how
an economy could go from a level of real monetary balances of almost 37% of GDP
in 1949 to a level of only 3.8% of GDP in 1984. This is the base of our (and many
18
others) argument that there has been a process of demonetization of the Argentine
economy together with a process of currency substitution taking place. Table 2.2
shows real domestic monetary balances and fiscal deficit as a percentage of GDP.
One could argue, as Peter N. Ireland does (1994, pp. 47-49) following
Wicksell (1978, p.66) that as an "economy grows: The gain ... obtained from
every saving in the medium of exchange . .. constitutes a spur to invention and
habitual use of a number of forms of credit which finally become an integral part of
the mechanism of trade. At every stage in commercial progress, therefore, we note
a new, and generally higher, average velocity of circulation of the medium of
exchange, which does not subsequently decrease." 3
We have seen the same pattern taking place in Argentina for the last
several decades. But we could ask: Are the reasons behind this path similar than
for highly developed and high growth countries? The reasons for this trend in high
growth countries are given by Ireland (1994 p.48): "If, . . . , demand deposits
gradually replace currency and are themselves, in turn, replaced by credit
instruments as means of exchange, then a systematic increase in broad monetary
aggregates (that include privately issued securities) relative to narrower empirical
definitions of money (that are dominated by the government-issued medium of
exchange) should be observed within economies over time." Nevertheless, these
are not the reasons for "getting out of domestic balances," or getting out of narrow
Ireland (1994).
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definitions of money in Argentina. This has not been a consequence of high growth
and modernization of the Argentine economy. The fact of the matter, for the case
of Argentina, is that this demonetization has quite different sources. These sources
go from a negative rate of growth for several years since the 1970's to a process
of backwardness of the overall economy, to a high dependency on inflationary
taxation to sustain the fiscal deficit.
Continuing with our historic analysis, one of the most impressive downward
jumps in real monetary holdings was from 1974 to 1975. What was the reason for
this decrease in real monetary holdings by individuals? Table 2.2 will try to give a
temporary answer to this question. However, before doing this, we need to say
here that the information on Table 2.2 comes from different sources. The different
figures between those sources have created several problems. This has been
pointed out by several authors of which Daniel Heymann [1987] says: "there has
been much debate about the size of the fiscal deficit, mainly referring to the
treatment of central bank accounts."4
4Heymann (1987).
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Table 2.2
FISCAL DEFICIT AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP
Year Fiscal Deficit Year Fiscal Deficit Year Fiscal Deficit
1945 4.6 1965 3.4 1985 9.1
1946 6.9 1966 4.7 1986 5.2
1947 5.8 1967 4.1 1987 9.3
1948 13.4 1968 1.9 1988 9.9
1949 9.8 1969 0.9
1950 5.5 1970 2.4
1951 4.5 1971 3.1
1952 5.6 1972 4.0
1953 8.8 1973 7.9
1954 8.5 1974 9.5
1955 6.9 1975 15.3
1956 5.0 1976 15.1
1957 5.5 1977 11.8
1958 9.6 1978 13.6
1959 2.9 1979 10.5
1960 2.7 1980 13.0
1961 5.6 1981 16.7
1962 7.9 1982 16.4
1963 5.8 1983 19.4
1964 6.3 1984 16.6
Source : Di Tella and Dornbusch, The Political Economy of Argentina, 1946-83. Kiguel and Liviatan,
"The Old and the New in Heterodox Stabilization Programs: Lessons from the Sixties and the Eighties."
We can see here that there are two distinguishable periods, one that goes
from 1945 to 1974 and a second one that goes from 1975 to 1990. As we can see,
with one exception in 1948 (13.8% of GDP), the fiscal deficit never increased above
9.8 % of GDP for the period 1945-1974, and in fact the average fiscal deficit for the
period was barely 5.8 % of GDP with the highest being that of 1948 (13.8% of GDP)
and the lowest that of 1969 (0.9% of GDP). In contrast, for the period that started
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in 1975 the situation was completely different in terms of the fiscal deficit. However,
this was not because of an effective increase in government expenditures or any
other change in policy by the government. This was one of the consequences of the
oil crisis of 1974, which complicated the fiscal situation of the country through the
state-owned enterprises, the major instrument for redistributive policies used by the
Argentine government. Since these enterprises were a major instrument for
redistributive policies, employing a large percentage of the labor force, the
government could not reduce employment without creating major social and political
disruptions.
To this we have to add the disastrous taxing history of the Argentine
government. 5 As the World Development Report [1988] says, "a 1978 study of
income tax in Argentina found that 80% of gross income was not reported and that
only 30% of 1.6 million people eligible to pay taxes on non-wage income did so."
In an excellent work by A. Fishlow and J. Friedman (1994) they conclude
that: "our estimations suggest that Argentina exhibits very high elasticity of evasion
to expected income. Growth is then preceded by sharp increases in the budget
deficit. Reliance on additional inflationary financing is doomed to fail because
Argentina also exhibits a very high elasticity of evasion to inflation tax. Thus for
GNP to expand, the model tells us that Argentina must first secure the financing to
5Recently, Carlos A. Rodriguez (1994a) has challenged this argument and
in fact argues that the excess tax burden has contributed to the crises in Argentina.
6World Development Report [1988], Page 85.
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offset the increased evasion that takes place in the initial stage. If it does not the
country will face episodes of high inflation or even hyperinflation that will finally
frustrate growth. One may interpret recent policy as doing exactly this."7
Complicating things even further we have to add the fact that the government
decided to go to the foreign capital market to finance the deficit, instead of trying
to cut it by either selling state-owned enterprises or changing the tax structure and
assuring its compliance, or both.8
As Jacob Frenkel (1983) argued in this respect: "the liberalization of the
capital account is likely to encourage the process of currency substitution. This
phenomenon results in an effective reduction of the tax base for inflationary finance.
Unless the need for inflationary finance is reduced, the opening up to the capital
account and the resultant shrinkage of the inflationary tax base may result in an
accelerated rate of inflation as the government attempts to collect the needed
revenue from the smaller tax base."9
7A. Fishlow and J. Friedman (1994), p. 121.
8Which is what the Menem administration has achieved through Minister
Cavallo's economic plan.
9Frenkel (1983), p. 169.
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2.2 GOING GLOBAL, OR GOING BROKE?
The military government thought that since the financing of the deficit by
internal means (or by money creation, i.e., inflation tax) was producing high
inflation, then by going to the foreign capital markets to finance the deficit, inflation
would have to subside because the reason for that inflation would have
disappeared.
In words of Larry A. Sjaastad [1989] "until 1977, the fiscal deficit was
financed by internal inflation, but from that year forward a substantial part was
financed by foreign borrowing, a practice that made possible the acquisition of large
amounts of international reserves by the Central Bank. Paradoxically, those
reserves, accumulated via deficit financing through foreign borrowing, made it
possible to sustain the 'Plan del 20 de Diciembre" 0 well beyond its period of
usefulness [assuming, of course, that it was useful at all]'1 . Nevertheless, there can
be no doubt that the persistent fiscal deficit eroded the credibility of the Plan
because (a) permanent reliance on foreign finance of the deficit was regarded as
implausible if not impossible, and (b) the low rates of inflation implied by a stable
'
0This plan established a preannounced exchange rate depreciation
schedule better known as "La Tablita". One of the most distinguishing
characteristics was that the rate of devaluation was lower than the rate of internal
inflation which implied an appreciation of the real exchange rate or an overvaluation
of the local currency.
"This comment is ours.
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exchange rate (the final objective of the Plan) could not generate enough 'inflation
tax' to finance the fiscal deficit." 2
Although the first part of the argument presented above is probably correct,
the second part was never a reality because inflation never decreased below 100%
per year with this plan, which would have produced a significant inflation tax to
finance the deficit. Of course, this would have been true had it not been for the
phenomenon of currency substitution by which individuals successfully avoided this
inflation tax by holding foreign currency, and, in our case, by holding U.S. dollars.
We would be looking at the effects of currency substitution over the
alternatives available to governments, and to individual consumers in less
developed countries and the consequences of this development over the
independence and efficiency, or not, of monetary policy.
In fact, what was happening during this period was a huge inflow of reserves
and the possibility for the government to subsidize the purchase of dollars by
individual consumers or individual firms at a pre-established and changing
exchange rate. Rudiger Dornbusch and Juan Carlos de Pablo (1989) say to this
respect that "nineteen seventy-nine is a typical year for the combination of policies
to attract capital inflows. Interest rates are very high relative to the rate of
depreciation. The return from borrowing in New York and lending in Buenos Aires
in December 1979, for example, is above 50 percent per year! Moreover, because
'
2Sjaastad (1989).
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of high (and growing) reserves, the policy is believable." 3
TABLE 2.3
RESERVES HELD BY THE CENTRAL BANK
Year Reserves Year Reserves Year Reserves
1945 1,639 1965 265.1 1985 4,702
1946 1,733 1966 251.1 1986 4,426.2
1947 1,175 1967 754.4 1987 3,732.5
1948 772 1968 792.4 1988 5,157
1949 664 1969 560.2 1989 3,643
1950 843.2 1970 724.7 1990 4,432
1951 707.6 1971 316.7 1991 6,599
1952 608 1972 529 1992 10,558
1953 633.4 1973 1,412.4 1993 13,864
1954 654.3 1974 1,340.8 1994 17,600
1955 509.2 1975 617.7
1956 433.6 1976 1,771.9
1957 333.2 1977 3,862.4
1958 179.1 1978 5,828.9
1959 396.5 1979 10,137.6
1960 702.9 1980 7,288.3
1961 501.9 1981 3,719.1
1962 195.8 1982 3,047.8
1963 326.9 1983 3,213.2
1964 198 1984 2,590.9
Sources: The Political Economy of Argentina, 1946-1983, Ed. by Guido Di Tella and Rudiger
Dornbusch. "Fundaci6n Mediterr nea Newsletter," Several Issues.
In fact, a characteristic that differentiates Argentina's debt problem from the
rest of the Latin American countries is that "in Argentina's case the government has
13Rudiger Dornbusch and Juan Carlos de Pablo, 1989.
26
an external debt, but the private sector has matching external assets."'14 That is to
say, there was a process of redistribution of income and accumulation of wealth
toward the sectors that could get hold of foreign currency, principally the export and
import sectors and some industrial and service sectors involved with the military
government. Nevertheless, not every sector in society had the possibility of taking
advantage of this situation. In fact the Martinez de Hoz' 5 period was known in
Argentina as the period of the "Plata Dulce" (or Sweet Money).
Furthermore, by various estimates, [Dornbusch, 1985; Watson et al. 1986;
Rodriguez, 1986] capital flight from Argentina16 amounted to approximately 24
billion dollars for the period 1979-1982 alone. Of course, these estimates include
one of the oldest ways (and one of the more effective ones during periods of forced
capital immobility) to get away with "illegal capital flight" from any country. This is
the under invoicing of exports and the over invoicing of imports.
Ugo Fasano-Filho (1986) has the following comment from Arriazu, an advisor
to the Economic Minister of Argentina: "Should we control capital movements? And
if the answer is affirmative, can we really control capital movements? ... But do the
14Juan Carlos de Pablo and Rudiger Dornbusch (1987).
15Jos6 Alfredo Martinez de Hoz was Economic Minister for the military
government that took over in 1976.
16We say here capital flight from "Argentina" and not from "Argentineans" as
some authors like to say because these "Plata Dulce" was not limited only to
Argentinean nationals. In fact, who ever brought dollars and invested them in
Argentina was guaranteed a return on its "investment" of at least 50 percent.
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authorities control capital movements or does the public? My own experience in
Argentina makes me very doubtful of the possibilities of controlling capital flows. In
1975, for example, Argentina introduced one of the more severe and extensive sets
of capital controls in force in the international economy; during that year the current
account registered a deficit exceeding US$ 1 billion, at the same time that
Argentines accumulated foreign assets abroad also exceeding US$ 1 billion. How
could this accumulation take place with so many controls? Basically, through
overinvoicing and underinvoicing ... The experience of 1978 also tends to confirm
this fact ... In order to stop these flows, the government decided to introduce an
interest equalization tax, ... with this measure, capital flows disappeared as such,
but capital continued flowing in, now in the form of export prepayments. As a
deposit was also required for these flows, capital then began to flow in the form of
export pre-financing, and when these flows were also restricted, the movements
took the form of overinvoicing and underinvoicing. Exchange sales by tourists also
increased during the period, even though these 'tourists' were obviously
Argentines."17
Looking at Table 2.4 we can see how the debt grew during this period [1976-
86].
17Ugo Fasano-Filho (1986), p. 65.
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Table 2.4
ARGENTINA'S
TOTAL INDEBTEDNESS AND DEBT TO GDP RATIO
Year TOTAL DEBT* DEBT/GDP(%)
1963 3,391 21.6
1964 2,916 16.9
1965 2,650 14.0
1966 2,663 14.0
1967 2,644 13.6
1968 2,805 13.8
1969 3,230 14.6
1970 3,876 16.7
1971 4,525 18.2
1972 5,788 21.8
1973 6,233 20.0
1974 7,968 20.4
1975 7,875 18.6
1976 8,279 18.6
1977 9,679 19.2
1978 12,496 23.9
1979 19,034 30.2
1980 27,162 37.3
1981 35,671 48.1
1982 43,634 60.3
1983 44,781 59.5
1984 47,821 60.5
1985 48,312 64.5
1986 51,422 65.1
Source : Di Tella and Dornbusch, The Political Economy of Argentina, 1946-83.
*Total Debt = Private + Government Debt in millions of U.S. dollars
We could have split the debt column to reflect public (government debt) and
private debt but the fact is that by 1984 (the end of the last military dictatorship in
29
Argentina) almost all private debt was transferred to the public sector. De Pablo
and Dornbusch [1989] says that "in 1980 about half of the external debt was owed
by the public sector; by 1985 that share had increased to 82 percent."
In fact, this indebtedness process had no counterpart in growth for the
economy. During this period the government encouraged indebtedness as a
process of 're-industrialization and modernization' of the economy with the same
government being the guarantor of such debts. As we can imagine, such
investments in modernization were not real investments but ways of getting foreign
currency, thus contributing to the process of currency substitution and to the so
called "Plata Dulce" period.
Larry Sjaastad (1989) argues that:
"During the period in question (1976-81), the external debt of Argentina
increased dramatically, even when taking into account the impressive growth
of international reserves in the hands of the Central Bank. That growth in
reserves was, incidentally, largely a consequence of the policies that
accompanied the 'Plan del 20 de Diciembre'. The combination of the
liberalisation of the domestic capital market (which had begun before 1979),
the opening of that market to the rest of the world, and the decision to
finance much of the fiscal deficit in that market made possible an
unprecedented growth of reserves."
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2.3 CURRENCY SUBSTITUTION IN ARGENTINA
To have an idea of the importance of currency substitution during the period
1976-1981, a transcription of Sjaastad (1989, pp. 265-66) will be useful:
"...Argentina's gross external debt increased by nearly $16 billion during
1979 and 1980, most of it as a liability of the public sector (or guaranteed by
the government). A substantial part of that increase in foreign indebtedness
was, ironically, a direct consequence of the highly favourable international
reserve position of the Central Bank. During the course of 1980, and
perhaps even earlier, fear of an unscheduled devaluation (which resulted in
extraordinary high peso interest rates on deposits as the Argentine banks
struggled to maintain those deposits) began to erode the monetary base as
individuals moved out of pesos and into dollars. To prevent a decline in
international reserves in the face of that currency substitution, a decline that
might well have produced a 'run' against the peso, the public sector
borrowed heavily abroad and held the proceeds in the form of peso deposits.
While this action temporarily prevented a decline in the global demand for
pesos (and hence the monetary base and international reserves), it meant
that external debt was rising to unprecedented levels, the bulk of that debt
being a liability of the public sector. This borrowing was, of course, in
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addition to the growth in external indebtedness resulting from financing the
fiscal deficit in the capital market."
But why is it that currency substitution is such an important issue in
Argentina? One of the main reasons is that it creates greater inequality because not
every sector in society, or not every individual in society, is able to hold or hoard
the necessary amount of money that will enable him or her to command some
proportion of foreign currency in the case of higher local inflation. However, in an
excellent article Jacek Rostowski (1992) concludes that " . . to the extent to which
inflation tax is regressive, as is claimed for example by Dornbusch, Sturzenegger
and Wolf (1990), then widespread legal currency substitution will act to equalize
incomes."' 8 This conclusion would be true if the access to foreign currency
balances were to be similar for all income groups and geographical areas of the
country, which is not the case of the Argentine economy and probably for other less
developed countries, or if there were no costs associated with switching to foreign
currency balances. Sturzenegger (1992) has concluded that "currency substitution
takes place in high inflation economies, and rich people have preferential access
to this technology. In our setup, this preferential access was induced by a fixed cost
of currency substitution, which made this technology profitable only for sufficiently
1
"Jacek Rostowski (1992), p. 104.
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high levels of income."'
In fact, the cost of "getting" into foreign balances is intimately related to
asymmetries due to the lack of financial and geographical integration of the country.
Even legal currency substitution will not make this practice widespread, as
Rostowski argues.
Rostowski argues in favor of widespread currency substitution during high
inflation episodes to avoid or reduce the " . .. 'noise' affecting the information
carried by relative prices."(Rostowski 1992, p.92) He shows that currency
substitution helps in maintaining the level of output when inflation is high and
individuals would not be able to discern whether changes in prices were due to
"underlying supply and demand relationships for particular goods, or merely the
result of changes in the average price level." (Rostowski 1992, p.92)
Rostowski then compares currency substitution and indexation as two ways
in which highly inflationary economies adjust. He says that "both are commonly
viewed as causing an acceleration of inflation, although it is sometimes admitted
that they also mitigate the disruptive real effects of high inflation. Like indexation,
secondary currencies facilitate inter-temporal contracts. In very high inflation
contracts which are to extend over significant periods must either be indexed or
expressed in a stable second currency. However, using a secondary currency for
this purpose is more efficient since much indexation can only take place discretely
"Federico A. Sturzenegger (1992), p. 190.
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and the time between valorizations cannot be the same for all goods, so that
relative prices vary sharply between valorizations. This is the well known Taylor
effect." (Rostowski 1992, p.93)
Rostowski concludes that currency substitution should be preferred to
indexation because "unlike indexation secondary currencies make it easier for
relative prices at a point in time to vary in response to underlying market conditions,
and for variations in relative prices to act as signals to economic actors."
(Rostowski, 1992, p. 94)
Due to the absence of capital markets, or more specifically, of well
established and efficient capital markets in almost every underdeveloped country,
individuals are only able to hold their savings or their assets in the form of local
currency.20 If this local currency is depreciating continuously (i.e., if the rate inflation
is constant, and positive) then the opportunity cost of holding real monetary
balances will increase continuously. Furthermore, if the government is using
inflation as a tax over consumers, that is to say, if seigniorage is being collected by
the government, individuals will try to hold other assets instead of local currency.
This is one, or the most important reason, for currency substitution, in which
individual consumers get out of local currency in order to avoid this inflation tax
imposed by the government.
20This is one of the main difference between Argentina's hyperinflationary
processes and that of, for example, Germany's hyperinflation in the 1920's.
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But currency substitution is intimately related to the distribution of income in
many other ways. Individual agents in lower income strata will tend to have a
reduced number of alternatives when faced with higher inflation than individual
agents in higher levels of income. Investing in real estate has been one of the most
important ways in which higher and middle income Argentines have been trying to
shield themselves from the effects of higher inflation. To this issue it would be
useful to bring paragraph from the case of Israel in the 1980's:
"Even in an indexed environment, inflation causes problems with
savings, too. The most salient symptom is the tendency of households to
accumulate assets in the form of real estate, on the supposition that this form
of wealth is better shielded from inflation. In fact, the added demand for
apartments as a form of investment actually did cause their prices to inflate
more rapidly. During 1979, for example, housing prices increased by 159
percent, while the consumer price index rose by 111 percent. This
misallocation of resources was evident from the considerable number of
empty apartments that people maintained as a hedge against inflation." 22
But what is the problem of investing in real estate in a society characterized
21The similarities between the Israeli economy and the Argentine economy
are constantly addressed by many authors.
22Yakir Plessner (1994), pp. 205-206.
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by a highly unequal distribution of income? The problem is that only a small
percentage of the population, those who are able to hoard enough foreign currency
to buy real estate through a cash transaction due to the inexistence of a credit
market, will be able to 'invest' in real estate. They will be the only ones that have
enough income to 'invest' in this type of venture. The situation in Argentina is
similar to that of Israel in that individuals tend to buy real estate to protect
themselves against inflation.
The rest of the population will have no alternative but, probably, to increase
consumption before their money diminishes its value or to buy foreign currency
immediately after they collect their salaries, which implies an increase in the
velocity of circulation of money. This produces higher inflation without an increase
in the supply of money, which produces a reduction in foreign reserves held by the
country, which, at the same time, produces a pressure to devaluate the local
currency. If this happens it acts like an accommodating type of policy on the part of
the government, which produces what is called a 'devaluation-inflation spiral.'
Another implication of currency substitution has to do with geographical
location and integration of the financial system within the country. There are only
three to four cities in Argentina that could be said to be integrated to the world
capital market so as to enable its citizens to effectively exchange their local
currency for foreign currency. At the same time, the cost involved in shifting to a
foreign currency will be higher in non-financially integrated regions of the country
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than in the case of people living in Buenos Aires or other financial centre of the
country. The rest of the country, and several sectors within these big cities, will be
unable of shielding themselves from increases in inflation and will be the most
affected by a change in this rate.
We will see later on that theoretical models dealing with currency substitution
use the assumption that individuals are "lump-sum" compensated by the
government for the increased opportunity cost of holding real monetary balances.
In fact we will assume later on that instead of receiving proportional23 lump-sum
transfers of money, a possible assumption will be that they receive non-proportional
lump-sum transfers. But we will be discussing this issue in greater detail in later
chapters.
Currency substitution has become a big issue in the economic literature, and
specifically when talking or analyzing the creation or the development of the
European Monetary System in one side and in discussing its effects over monetary
policy in highly inflationary, and underdeveloped, economic systems. To the former
we could mention papers by Michael Woodford (1990), Alberto Giovannini (1991),
Maurice Obstfeld (1991,1994), Philippe Weil (1991), Alessandra Casella (1990),
etc. The later argument deals with currency substitution and exchange rate
23Proportional to their own holdings of real monetary balances. We will see
later on that the "representative individual" assumption "imposes" these results to
these models, although this "representative individual" takes these transfers as
"independent" from its own real monetary holdings.
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variability and has a vast literature that began with Guillermo Calvo and Carlos
Alfredo Rodriguez (1977) and continued with Liviatan (1981), Calvo (1985), Penati
(1987), Engel (1989), Sturzenegger (1991,1992), and finally the paper by Heng-Fu
Zou (1993), just to mention some of them.
Still, we will be looking even further into the issue of currency substitution.
We will argue that although real foreign monetary balances cannot be negative, the
supply of foreign real monetary balances depends on the trade surplus (deficit) of
the country24 and it will not be supplied 'free of charge' as is the case of domestic
real monetary balances. This implicit cost of 'getting' into foreign monetary balances
will have its implications on the assumptions we make on the behavior of agents
and their expectations for the future ( i.e., whether there will be a trade surplus or
a trade deficit).
2.4 MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT CURRENCY SUBSTITUTION
While the issue of currency substitution has had a great deal of intellectual
importance over the last decades, we still think that there are misconceptions about
the reasons and the origins of such a phenomenon. Some of these misconceptions
are discussed below.
24 Other alternatives could be through financial assistance from other
countries or through capital mobility in order to sustain a specific exchange rate.
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2.4.1 Currency Substitution As A Choice Of Governments
The fact of the matter with respect to currency substitution is not that governments
decide to "introduce" an indexed currency (like in Sturzenegger, 1994) so as to
reduce the rate of inflation or hyperinflation of the original currency, but that
currency substitution is an alternative from the individual agent point of view, given
the expectations of the future. Governments are, if anything else, reacting to a
decision made by individual agents. 25
Currency substitution is not being "imposed" from above by a "benevolent"
government. Currency substitution is something that will be decided independently
from the government by the individual consumer who distrusts of the "ability," or the
"desire," or the "willingness" on the part of the government to control
(hyper)inflationary processes. In fact, there has always been a direct link between
institutional political disintegration and hyperinflationary processes.26
Much of the literature on currency substitution deals with the issue of the
alternatives from the point of view of the government with respect to the correct rate
2sSuch has been the case of the Real Plan introduced in Brazil in 1994. The
Convertibility Plan in Argentina is also a reaction by the government to the currency
substitution phenomenon.
26Germany would be the most pathetic example of this characteristic, but
Argentinas' hyperinflationary processes have had their own doses of institutional
political disintegration, i.e., Isabel Peron in 1976, Galtieri-Bignone in 1982-83, and
Alfonsin in 1989-90. The lack of control of the future is one of the similarities, if any,
between these three events.
39
of growth of the money supply. Nothing is further from the truth. Governments do
not choose currency substitution as an alternative to uncontrollable inflationary
processes. Quite the opposite, for these governments, currency substitution is a
constraint on their ability to collect taxes by increasing the supply of money and on
the independence of monetary policy.
Rogers (1992) argues that "the degree to which an economy's total
transactions are conducted in U.S. dollars rather than domestic currency is referred
to as 'dollarization,' a phenomenon that may be important for several reasons.
When demand for dollars grows beyond the requirements of tourism and
international trade, it is difficult for the monetary authority to find an appropriate
definition of money and to control domestic liquidity." (Rogers 1992, p.320)
Bufman and Leiderman argue that "if the degree of currency substitution is
high, small changes in the money supply would induce large changes in the
exchange rate. These circumstances are likely to reduce the effectiveness of
monetary policy by contracting the component of domestic liquidity over which the
authorities have direct influence. Increased currency substitution may also require
an adjustment of fiscal policy because of the induced reduction in the inflation-tax
base. Moreover, perfect substitutability makes a multicurrency region more
vulnerable to hyperinflations." This was also the conclusion put forward by Weil
(1991), although we will show that imperfect substitutability between currencies do
not necessarily reduce the scope for hyperinflationary solutions. We are going to
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analyze this issue further throughout this dissertation.
2.4.2 Currency Substitution Vs. Financial Adaptation
We are now going discuss the differences that we think exist between
currency substitution and financial adaptation.27 According to Peter N. Ireland
financial adaptation is a characteristic of modern economies. Sturzenegger (1992)
defines "financial adaptation" as " . . . an improvement in the savings or
transactions technology that creates convenient alternatives to money, (which) is
a well known phenomenon in high-inflation economies." (Sturzenegger, p.179)
Then, he continues saying that "there are many ways to evade the inflation tax,
from using credit cards, checkable interest-bearing accounts, or simply through
'dollarization'." (Sturzenegger 1992, p.179) But, this is not true for Argentina.
Currency substitution in Argentina cannot be identified with financial adaptation or
with the use of "credit cards," "checkable interest-bearing accounts" which is a
characteristic of "commercial progress. . . ." However, it can be identified with
producing similar consequences for an economic system due to the ". . . generally
higher, average velocity of circulation of the medium of exchange, .. . " in words
of Peter N. Ireland.28
27Sturzenegger (1992) uses both terms interchangeably.
28Again refer to pages 4 and 5 in Section 1.1.
41
In fact, the private banking system, as well as financial institutions (Diners
Club, Visa, Master Card, American Express, etc.) as we know them in the United
States (as providers or suppliers of alternative mediums of exchange), were greatly
transformed and/or ceased to exist in Argentina during highly inflationary
processes. At the beginning of the 1980's supermarkets started to accept credit
cards for purchases. However, this policy lasted only for a few months because
people started to use them to minimize their losses due to monthly inflation above
10%. Consumer credit was nonexistent in Argentina for these periods.
Then, the use of credit cards, which is one of the "ways" in which financial
adaptation shows up in an economy was not the characteristic of the Argentine
situation.
People shifted to holding foreign monetary balances, specially U.S. dollars,
to minimize the effects of inflation. However, U.S. dollars were not the only
substitutes to domestic monetary balances. While in Russia it has been argued that
people opted to hold commodity goods like vodka, in Argentina individuals were
willing to hold, at some periods, "cospeles del subterrsneo" (subway tokens) which
represented a fixed amount of service. 29 Each token represented a trip in the
subway in any direction and with "unlimited millage."30 They also used to hold
29We could say that these subway tokens were "backed" or "indexed." See
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1983), Sturzenegger (1992), and Weil (1991). We would see
this condition latter on in the dissertation.
30Actually, they were limited only to the extent that subways routs and
destinations were themselves limited.
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telephone tokens until the government-owned enterprise decided to reduce the
amount of time that each telephone communication lasted (a change in the
"impulsos," as is called in Argentina) with each token.
An example of financial adaptation in Argentina could be characterized by
the following example. Automobile purchases by consumers were characterized by
something called "Plan de Ahorro Previo" (the most notorious one was that of Ford
Motors Argentina, called "Plan Rombo," but every car manufacturer had a similar
program in place; the same thing happened with almost every durable and/or
expensive good). Of course high income individuals could buy these durable goods
at any moment because they held dollars in their portfolios. However, this was
created to expand their consumer market.
These programs translated into something like an "anticipated savings plan,"
(henceforth ASP) which could be compared with some type of 'lay-a-way' plan in the
United States. The most important difference between this ASP in Argentina and
a normal 'lay-a-way' plan in the United States is that the former plan was a highly
sophisticated group plan conceived as a way of increasing the consumer base or
to increase the potential market by helping low income consumers.
It was also put in place not only to increase their consumer market, which
was very small, but it also worked as an insurance to avoid excess supply of
automobiles during periods of high inflation and high uncertainty. It was also a way
of minimizing high fluctuations in output characteristic of high inflation episodes.
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This plan consisted of the following scheme: consumers were asked to
participate as members with other consumers to start paying monthly installments
toward the purchase of the car. Monthly instalments were not necessarily fixed,
rather, they were indexed to inflation. Each participant in this group was going to
make monthly payments for a period, let us say, of five years,31 after which they
were assured to receive their car. This could be one reason that total dollarization
has not been observed in Argentina, even with extremely high levels of monthly
inflation.
Then we could say that Financial Adaptation could prevent full dollarization
from taking place in a country. At the same time, Financial Adaptation is different
from currency substitution. These concepts are not interchangeable.
Why were these programs so common and successful? Furthermore, why
were they so persistent, even in highly inflationary periods? There were two main
reasons for this outcome. First, these customers were unable to purchase these
cars in an "all cash" transaction.32 They were mainly low to middle income
individuals, and mostly middle income individuals. Second, there were incentives
put forward by the auto manufacturers or by the administrators of the plan that
3 Of course, the amount of years depended in the type of good consumers
were purchasing. TV sets, refrigerators, etc., had shorter periods of prepayment.
32Cars were being sold on a cash basis due to the non-existence or lack of
consumer credit.
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consisted in giving "away" several cars per year.33 This ASP included an incentive.
The incentive was a raffle 34 by which participants had the opportunity (if luck was
on their side) of "winning" a car. The raffle was between the participants in this plan,
and most importantly, it depended on their good standing within the plan, i.e.,
having paid all installments to date. Of course, with the commitment of continuing
the payments until those five years had elapsed. So participants could wait five
years to "get" their car or, if they were lucky enough, get the car some day before
five years.
We could say that the above mentioned financial adaptation process also
prevented this economy to dollarize completely, even in high inflation or
hyperinflationary processes. This could be one of the financial instruments that
have prevented complete dollarization in Argentina. In fact, we could argue that
financial adaptation is one of the major reasons for full dollarization not to have
occurred, even in the presence of hyperinflationary situations.
Currency substitution, as Calvo (1985), Sturzenegger (1992), etc. argues is
related to an "improvement in the savings or transactions technology." However,
inflation creates many problems with the efficiency of these transaction
technologies. We could find some extreme cases in Argentina. Bars or pubs
(confiterias), with pool tables, did not change their pool tables "technology" so as
33The number of cars depended on the surplus production for each year and
some minimum number of cars to be given out each year stipulated by the ASP.
34Again the time span depended on the good being sold.
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to use tokens to run their pool tables machines. Consumers, instead had to buy
"quarters" (U.S. quarters) to be able to play pool. Consumers could buy a United
States "quarter" (25¢) for the equivalent of, let's say, $1.50 dollars in Argentinean
pesos to be able to play a game of pool!
Then, by the above example, financial adaptation does not mean currency
substitution. In fact, financial adaptation produced the use of new technologies (like
the pool tables payment mechanism mentioned above) but using the domestic
currency to conduct the transaction. Thus, currency substitution cannot be identified
with financial adaptation, and in fact, financial adaptation could be one of the major
causes for full dollarization not to have taken place in Argentina.
2.4.3 Currency Substitution Vs. Capital Flight
Another misconception about currency substitution is that of identifying it with
capital flight, or at least for arguing that currency substitution is indistinguishable
from the capital flight phenomenon. This is incorrect in the sense that even without
earning a return on those balances, individuals will still choose to hold this type of
balances in their portfolios, or in their banks' safe deposits. Or they may hold these
balances because of the inexistence of efficient capital markets, credit markets, or
efficient banking systems.
In fact, Argentines will hold foreign monetary balances, U.S. dollars, even
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knowing that with a positive dollar inflation rate the purchasing power of their
dollars will be diminished.
2.4.4 Dollarization Vs. Currency Substitution
The last issue in this section has to do with the difference between dollarization and
currency substitution. This point has been put forward by Calvo and V6gh (1992).
They argue that "...casual evidence suggests that, in high inflation countries,
foreign currency is first used as a store of value or unit of account and only later as
a medium of exchange. In other words, currency substitution is normally the last
stage of the dollarization process."(Calvo and Vegh 1992, p. 4)
We will see all along this dissertation that dollarization is indeed different
from currency substitution, and that we cannot analyze the effects of currency
substitution on the domestic inflation rate by looking only at the process of
dollarization taking place in Argentina. In fact, dollarization is a process that takes
time, that is to say, it spans over a long period of time, and it depends
fundamentally on the exchange rate and its relationship with the current account (or
the balance of payments if capital is not mobile), while currency substitution can be
analyzed at a specific point in time and depends on legal or institutional
requirements of a specific country and in the availability of foreign monetary
balances in the possession of individuals.
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CHAPTER 3
DEVALUATION: WITH ENDOGENOUS RATES OF TIME
PREFERENCE AND HETEROGENEOUS AGENTS
3.1 INTRODUCTION
In this chapter we will use the same assumptions used by Calvo's 1981 article but
in the context of endogenous rates of time preference used by Obstfeld's 1990
article. We, as Calvo does, are going to examine the cases where either the price
level jumps (i.e. a devaluation), or there is a change in the rate of inflation (i.e. a
change in the rate of devaluation), letting money supply be determined by the
balance of payments.
The results are, as in Calvo (1980), that a devaluation always improves the
balance of payments (if seignorage from inflation is returned to the public) while an
increase in the rate of devaluation has the opposite effect, i.e. it deteriorates the
balance of payments. However, differences arise due to the fundamental difference
in the nature of our model, which assumes endogenous rates of time preference.
The rate of time preference will be smaller after an increase in the rate of
devaluation, which implies that consumers will be less impatient under endogenous
that under fixed rates of time preference. This is a consequence of the assumption
48
that there is no capital mobility.'
3.2 ASSUMPTIONS OF THE MODEL 2
As it was said in the introduction, we are going to make the same assumptions that
those of Calvo's (1981) so be advised that this is just an enumeration of these
assumptions and are taken directly from that paper. It will be just a quick refresher.
In this model, c and m stand for consumption and real (domestic) monetary
balances;m - M where M and P are domestic nominal money holdings and the
P
price level respectively.
We assume a small open economy which implies that international prices
and exchange rate between foreign currencies remain constant over time, allowing
us to identify P with the exchange rate (i.e., the relative price) of domestic currency
in terms of some other given currency.
Each family (representative consumer) receives y units of output per unit of
time and the only available asset is domestic money (this assumption implies no
international capital mobility).
'See Obstfeld (1981) where he studies the case when there is perfect capital
mobility. With perfect capital mobility, the world interest rate is given and equal to
the endogenous rate of time preference.
2These assumptions are taken directly from Calvo (1981), pp. 165-172.
3We will change this assumption latter on in this chapter.
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The inflation rate n = - = rate of devaluation. = government lump-sum
P
transfers. We assume that t is chosen so as to compensate for the 'maintenance'
or depreciation cost of holding money, and that it takes the form of money transfers.
Along an equilibrium path,
balance of payments at time t =y - c (1)
Therefore, if M' denotes nominal supply of money, we have
where 'hat' indicates equilibrium solutions and
i = TrM (Iii)
i.e. the flow supply of money is determined by the accumulations of reserves
(y -8)P (iv)
plus the rate of (what is usually called) domestic credit
cP (v)
By (3.2), (iii), and (ii), we get
m=y - 8 (vi)
And finally, the consumer is assumed to know the paths of P and i but takes
them as exogenous and independent of its individual behavior. This amounts to
assuming Perfect Foresight and Perfectly Competitive Markets. We will also
assume that 7r (the rate of inflation) will be constant after t = 0.
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3.3 THE MODEL 4
We are considering a representative consumer which is infinitely lived. Each
consumer is assumed to be maximizing the following utility function:
U[C(0),m(0)] = - exp [ - z(t)]exp(-rt)dt (3.1)
subject to
tih=y+ t m-n-c (3.2)
and
z(t) = u[c(t),m(t)] - r ; z(0) = 0 (3.3)
The Current-value Hamiltonian for the individual maximization problem is
H(c,m,z, q, 6)
- exp(-z) + [y + t - 7tm - c] - w [u(c,m) - r] (3.4)
and gives us, in addition to (3.2) and (3.3), the necessary conditions
4This model is taken from Obstfeld (1990), pp. 45-75. The only difference
with Obstfeld's original model is that now real monetary balances are included
alongside with consumption in the utility function.
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u,(cm)o + q = 0 (3.5)
q = q[u(c,m) + 7r] + o u,,,(c,m) (3.6)
w = u(c,m)W + 1 (3.7)
where we have used the simplification that [Arrow and Kurtz (1970), and Obstfeld
(1990)]
q= qexp(z) ; w a6exp(z)
The transversality conditions sufficient for optimality [Arrow and Kurtz(1970), and
Obstfeld (1990)] are
lim, gexp(-r) 0 ; lim, -6)exp(-r) > 0
and
lim, q jmexp(-r) = 0 ; lim, -&m exp(-r) = 0
In order to calculate the rate of time-preference we use the definition of the
Volterra derivative, D, which is the quantity
Dv[U[C(0),m(0)], c(t),m(t)] exp [ - z(t) - r t] =
[ - uli[c(t),m(t)] w(t)]exp[- z(t) - r t] (3.8)
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which is equation (3.5), which measures the lifetime marginal utility at t = 0 from a
local increase at any point t > 0 along the path C(0), m(0). It is the rate of decrease
in the marginal utility of consumption and real money balances along a locally
constant consumption and real money balances path. Then, using (3.5) the rate of
time preference, denoted by p, is (minus) the logarithmic time derivative of
Dv {U[C(0),m(0)], c(t), m(t)}:
p = -ldo1g){UC(0),n(0)] cQt),rm(t)] IL(t) =_ht o (3.9)
dt
Using equation (3.5) then, we are able to calculate the rate of time
preference for the consumer using the Volterra derivative, DV:
S(m) t= u(c,rn)[1 + [6 + 1/u(c,m)] u c,m)]> 0 (3.10)[ - )u,(c,mn)]
which is similar to the rate of time preference derived by Obstfeld in his 1990
article, but, of course, with money as an argument in the utility function.
At steady-state with constant consumption (E) and constant money (m_), we
then have the following:
W -= (3.11)
u(c,m)
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which implies, in our case that (10) will be equal to
p(c,rno) = u(c,i) (3.12)
Let us look now at the solution for consumption using equation (3.5). Time
differentiation of (3.5) shows that
- u(c,m)5 o - UC,,(c,m)ril ( - 6 u,(c,m) = (3.13)
or rearranging
[- u'(c,m) o] c + [ - ue,,(c,m) W] i - 6 u(c,m) (3.13')
Using (3.7) to eliminate C and (3.6) to eliminate q and then applying (3.5)
to eliminate q and after some manipulation we get:
= [p (c,m,&) + T - " - p m] (3.14)
[uC(c,m) o]
where
a - < o (3.15)
and
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[un,,(c,m)o] > 0 (3.16)
[ujc,m) W]
where a (Epstein 1987, p.76) "...measures the effect of consumption growth on the
proportional rate of change of 'current valued' marginal utility..." In our case,
however, marginal utility of consumption "...is no longer uniquely related to c
because the marginal utility of c depends in general on m." (Blanchard and Fischer
1989, p. 189). Then, given U, the higher is -(i/o) the stronger is the desire to
smooth the consumption and money holdings profile.
3.4 RESULTS OF THE MODEL
As we argued at the beginning, the results are similar to those of Calvo 1981.
We are then left with three differential equations
6 = u(c,m)w + 1 (3.7)
c = a[p (c,m,&) + _ - "' , - p ] (3.14)
[ u,(c,mn) o]
and
h=y - c (3.17)
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Using these three equations and substituting (3.17) into (3.14) we get a system of
three differential equations in c, m and w :
= u(c,m) o + 1 (3.7)
e = a [p (cm,n) + ] - - p (y- c)] (3.14')
m =y -C c(3.17)
At steady state we have
(3.18)
ur(c,m)
)_ _ [u,,(cm) (]
U(c,m) + 7r - (3.19)
[ uG(c,m) c0]
and
y = c (3.20)
6 u(c,m) F G w -&
e = 8 u(c,m)+i [ . c-c (3.21)
.ii 0 -1 0 m-rn
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where
F= [u,(c,m)o]> 0 (3.21.1)
G = [u,,(c,m)o] >0 (3.21.2)
S = ( t [u,,,(c,m) - uG(c,m)7] <0 (3.21.3)
[ IIC(c,m) <]
13 = - -[[ -u,,,] [u(c,m)+ ] + u~,,,p] < 0 (3.21.4)
cc
For stability we need the trace of the principal matrix to be positive, so that
at least one eigenvalue is always positive. The trace of the principal matrix is:
trace = 2u(c,m) + n > 0 (3.22)
which is definitely positive.
The sign of the determinant is negative:
determinant = GS + u(c,m) P < 0 (3.23)
We have also used the following signs on the functions:
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u(c,mr)>0 ; uC(c,m) >0 ; u,(c,m) >0 ; uIC(c,m) < 0 ; um,(c,m) s 0 ; uC,(c,M) >0
And further, we are assuming that consumption and real money balances are
complementary in providing utility, then
-[- uC"(c,m) w] > 0
These assumptions mean that [Obstfeld, 1990]: uC, is assumed to be twice
continuously differentiable. The discount rate uC, is taken to be strictly positive.
With the added assumption that money and consumption are complementary in
utility.
Now we are going to proceed with the conclusions of the model. Then, since
an unanticipated devaluation is equivalent to an initial downward jump in initial m,
it trivially follows that such a policy will always improve the balance of payments (if
the inflation tax is returned to the consumer) just as in Calvo 1981.
If, on the other hand, we have an increase in the rate of devaluation, i.e., an
increase in 7r. Taking the partial derivative with respect to inflation we get the
following result:
_ = < 0 (3.24)
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from equation (19). Then the new steady state will be characterized by having the
same level of consumption and a lower level of real monetary balances, the latter
reflecting the larger opportunity cost of holding real monetary balances due to the
increase in the rate of inflation.
By linearizing the system in the neighborhood of the steady state we can
also look at the dynamics of the model. Then linearizing the three differential
equations around steady state we have:
ca(t) - W = zI A e (3.25.1)
c(t) - E = z2A e xi (3.25.2)
m(t) - mi = A e x9 (3.25.3)
where
A = (mo - )>0
[z2F + G]
zi = > Q
[u(c,m) - X1]
sRemember that this is due to equation (20) by which income is equal to
consumption at steady state.
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and
Z2 = -xl>0
By looking at equation (3.25.2) we can see that an increase in the rate of
devaluation (an increase in n ) produces an increase in consumption on impact
and at the same time a process of substitution between consumption and real
monetary balances in which the latter declines monotonically when 7r increases.
Real monetary balances cannot change on impact in this model because money is
a state variable. They will change (decrease to be more precise) across steady
states in a monotonic fashion. Let us see how the graphs of these variables will
look like.
Figure 3.1 shows that at time t, when there is an increase in the rate of
devaluation (an increase in the rate of inflation), consumption increases on impact
to c, and then decreases to its constant level C-. The increase in consumption can
come only from a decrease on the level of real monetary holdings by the
representative consumer, and at the aggregate or country level, by a deterioration
in the balance of payments.
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Figure 3.1
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As we said before, real monetary balances decrease monotonically towards
its new (lower) level in the new steady state. Money cannot jump instantaneously
to accommodate the change in the devaluation or inflation rate so it will only change
monotonically through time as showed by the following graph.
In Figure 3.2 we see how real monetary balances change at time t due to the
increase in the rate of devaluation (rate of inflation). Since real monetary balances
cannot change immediately to the new steady state value (remember that the
money supply is given by the balance of payments) the increase in consumption by
the representative consumer is due to the fact that individuals are running down
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their real monetary balances, or in this model, their savings (i.e., their wealth).
Figure3.2
m
t T
But what happens to lifetime welfare w, for this representative individual? By
looking at equation (3.25.1) we see that lifetime welfare decreases. Since agents
get utility by holding real monetary balances, there is a reduction in these real
monetary balances as a reflection of the higher opportunity cost of holding those
balances. Graphically we have the following figure
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Figure 3.3
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What happens in the new steady-state? Real monetary balances will be
lower than in the original steady-state, due to the higher opportunity cost of holding
real monetary balances, and because from (3.19) we get
u(cm) + Tu = um(c,m) uC(c,m)~
" (c,m) u (c,m)
U,(c,m)dm +d = " dm(m - '" dm
uC(c,m) uC(cm)2
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dn= [ """_"' ' - u ,,,(c )] dm
u,(c,m) ujc,m)2
then
dm<0
d7t
3.5 HETEROGENEOUS AGENTS
Next we are going to look at what happens when we introduce heterogeneous
consumers instead of a representative consumer. So we are going to rewrite the
equations of the model (or at least those that will help us to show the different
responses) using subscripts (or superscripts when we have partial derivatives) to
differentiate between individuals. The case of two individuals will be enough to
demonstrate our point although it will carry over to N individuals as well. The
stability of the model, that of being saddle path stable, carry over from the
representative consumer case.
Let's rewrite the equations needed to conduct this analysis just for ease of
manipulation but now introducing subscripts to account for heterogeneous
consumer.
thi = y, - ni + O o (MI + m 2 ) - cI (3.26a)
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mh2 = y2 - 7tm 2 + (1 - 8)a(m1 + m2) - c2 (3.26b)
- u (c,m)6, = q, (3.27)
q, = q,[u,(c,,m) + T] + Gll ur(c,m,) (3.28)
6i = u1(c1,,mn) i + 1 (3.29)
In long-run equilibrium with constant consumption we have also
lil = r65 = - _1_(3.30)
'0 - ui,(ci~m,) (.0
where overbars denote the steady-state levels of the variables. This last equation
implies that
pi = pjc,(F,,,il) = u,(c,rt) (3.31)
u,,(cpM,,) &,
e, = a,[p,(c,,m,,,) + 7 - - P,,] (3.32)
u (c.,m,) W;]
y1 = c1 + (1 - 8)Qm1 - Om2  (3.33a)
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y2 = c2 - (1 - 0)omI + 0m2 (3.33b)
where 0 is the proportionality parameter for lump-sum transfers. It takes values
from 0 to 1. That is to say, 0 0s 1.
The idea now is to look at the effects of an unexpected change in the rate of
devaluation in the case that we have one individual which receives more than
proportional6 real monetary transfers and some consumers receive less than
proportional real monetary transfers.7
We will see here that an unexpected change in the rate of devaluation (rate
of inflation) will affect the long-run level of consumption, due to the fact that y, is
no longer equal to c, at steady state and in fact, the level of consumption of each
agent will depend directly on the level of inflation and on the amount of lump-sum
transfers.
3.6 REDISTRIBUTION THROUGH LUMP-SUM TRANSFERS
We are using the case of Argentina just as a "benchmark" for the case in
6More than proportional to their own real monetary holdings. Remember that
before we were assuming that the representative individual received proportional
real monetary lump-sum transfers.
7Another difference that could have been assumed between individuals is
that they differed in their rate of time preference, or in their degree of impatience.
However, this issue will not be pursued here.
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which there is an "omnipresent" government with a huge position in the production
market and with non-traditional, highly sectorial mechanisms of income distribution
(redistribution). Although the Argentinean experiment of redistribution of income
was more through the production and distribution of goods and services, we are
assuming, just for this example, that this redistribution scheme was through lump-
sum transfers from the government.' Penati (1987, p. 251), in a somewhat different
model has shown that "the impact of an increase in the inflation tax on private
consumption, real balances and the real exchange rate may [be] indistinguishable
from that of an increase in government expenditure on non-traded goods." This is
one of the reasons why we are assuming that redistribution takes place through
lump-sum monetary transfers.
'Although Argentina is being used as a "benchmark" for similar situations in
the rest of the Latin American countries (i.e., highly unequally distributed income
and underdeveloped or semi-industrialized countries), there are basic differences
within these group of countries. For example, in comparing Argentina with Chile we
have to realize that even though they may share the above characteristics, they
differ fundamentally in the degree of political mobilization in relation to the degree
of institutionalization. Political mobilization (read also economic mobilization) in
Argentina has normally outpaced, political mobilization in Chile (although there was
an exception for the case of Chile during the Allende government) making it much
more difficult for the government in Argentina to avoid sectoral redistributive
schemes.
For an excellent discussion on the relationship between political mobilization
versus institutionalization (or what has been called "mass praetorianism") see
Samuel P. Huntington in Political Order in Changing Societies, Yale University
Press, New Haven and London, 1968.
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3.7 RESULTS WITH HETEROGENEOUS CONSUMERS AND NON-
PROPORTIONAL LUMP-SUM TRANSFERS
The basic dynamics of saddle path stability of the system remain the same. The
differences will be given now by the fact that consumers that receive less than
proportional lump-sum taxes will be "benefited" by increases in the rate of
devaluation (in the rate of inflation) and consumers that receive more than
proportional lump-sum transfers will be worst off if inflation increases.
To see this let us look at the comparative statics of the model. In order to do
that we are again assuming that we are at steady-state, then the system of
equations is given by
u,(c,,r ,) + - __"(cm = 0 (3.34.1)
y1 = c, + (1 -O)om - 0m 2  (3.34.2a)
y 2 = c2 --(1 -)" 1 + 0m 2  (3.34.2b)
u(t ,m,) + 1 = 0 (3.34.3)
Totally differentiating system (3.34.1)-(3.34.3) we have the following results
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which include the determinant of the matrix:
A = uu2 [BD - AD(o - aO) - BCoO] >0
where
A =[-u + - ' C'1 1 ]m> 0
, Z( u c ) 2
B =[-U + ]<__ - 0i (1 )2
U1 u u
C=[-u Z + M2 C2 2C2C2 ] > 0
C2 UC2 (1!C22
2 C2)2
Then we get the following results:
dc [BD([O - 1]rn1 +0nm2) -D(1 -O)a +Ba0]
which will be greater or less than zero depending on the transfer parameter 0.
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The same is true for the second agent:
dc2 [BD([1 - 0 ]m -0m2) + D(1 - 0)o - Bo ]
da A
Then the level of consumption in the new steady state depends on the level
of transfers received by each agent. Let us say that agent one gets higher than
proportional lump-sum transfers, then agent one will have a higher level of
consumption on the new steady state. At the same time, agent two will have a lower
level of consumption at the new steady state. That is to say, agent two is negatively
affected by an increase in the inflation rate and by the redistribution of income
through non-proportional lump-sum transfers.
The results for welfare are the following:
do_ oj[u (BD[am - Om2] +Dao-Ba0) - u, (D +AD[am - mr2 ] -o0[A + CI)]
do u1[BD - AD ao - BCoO]
where a =(1 -0)>O.
For agent two we have the following:
dw2 _ 2[uc(BD[-am, +Om 2] +Dao+BoO) -u 2(B +BC[am - m2] - 4a[ + C])]
do u2 [BD -AD ao - BCoO]
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where now -a = (0 - 1) < 0.
These results are not easy to analyze. However, it will be fair to say that
since agent one increases consumption from the original steady state to the new
steady state, that welfare of agent one will be higher in the new steady state. The
opposite will be true for agent two. Since consumption for agent two is lower in the
new steady state than in the original, welfare of agent two will probably decrease
in the new steady state.
Both agents will suffer, nevertheless, a decrease in their wealth because of
the higher opportunity cost of holding real monetary balances. However, for those
individuals that receive more than proportional real monetary transfers, an increase
in the rate of inflation will improve their levels of consumption and probably, welfare,
while wealth will decrease. For those agents that receive less than proportional real
monetary transfers, the same increase in the rate of inflation will decrease their
consumption, their welfare and their level of wealth in the new steady state.
However, wealth (that is savings in our case) will be relatively higher for those
agents that receive more than proportional real monetary balances.
Let us see now the results for real monetary holdings:
dmi _ [D +AD([1 - O]m- 07m2) -AoO - CO]
do [BD - AD(1 -O)o -BCcO]
It is interesting to note that there is a possibility for this result to be positive,
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that is to say, agent one will increase real monetary balances in the new steady
state. This outcome would be possible if lump-sum transfers are big enough so as
to make the second term in the numerator bigger than the other terms. However,
it will be fair to say that this result is negative due to the increase in the opportunity
cost of holding real monetary balances.
For agent two the result is the following:
dm2 _ [B-BC([1 -O]m -0m 2)-(A+C)(1 -O)o]
do [BD -AD(1 -O)o-BC6a]
Agent two will definitely reduce its monetary holdings in the new steady
state, as shown by the previous equation, where all the terms in the numerator are
negative if we assume that agent one receives more than proportional lump-sum
transfers.
Again, the country will experience a deterioration in the balance of payments
due to the increase in the rate of inflation.
3.8 CONCLUSION
We have shown that an increase in the rate of devaluation (in the rate of inflation)
produced a deterioration in the balance of payments for a country when capital is
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immobile.9 Furthermore, we also showed that the rate of time preference will be
lower in the new steady state because of the fact that agents are holding lower
monetary balances with a constant level of consumption. That meant that agents
had become less impatient due to the increase in the rate of inflation and to the fact
that they were lump-sum compensated by the effects of the higher opportunity cost
of holding real monetary balances.
We were also able, in this model, to look at the effects of an increase in the
rate of inflation on the welfare of consumers. Welfare was reduced as a
consequence for the hole country as well as wealth because of a reduction in
savings.
When we allowed for heterogeneous consumers, we observed that this
heterogeneity came about by assuming that these consumers received less than
or more than proportional lump-sum transfers. In this case, those agents that
received more than proportional real monetary transfers were benefited in terms of
consumption and welfare but they were worst off in terms of wealth by an increase
in the rate of inflation. On the other hand, agents that received less than
proportional real monetary transfers experienced a reduction in their consumption
and welfare levels as well as in their wealth levels. That is to say, agents that were
being favored by a lump-sum transfers redistributive scheme became themselves
9As was the case in the original work by Calvo (1981) with constant rate of
time preference.
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"winners" in every respect even though they held a relatively larger wealth (savings)
than those who received less than proportional real monetary transfers.
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CHAPTER 4
COMMENTS ON THE ASSUMPTIONS USED IN
CURRENCY SUBSTITUTION MODELS
4.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter will deal with some necessary, although probably not sufficient,
conditions and assumptions on the models of currency substitution that follow. This
exercise is needed because some results of the following chapters are directly
linked to these assumptions.
This chapter has the intention of looking at these different assumptions and
to explain their intuition. The literature on the issue of currency substitution is
extensive, from the article written by Calvo and Rodriguez (1977) to the articles by
Liviatan (1981), Calvo (1985), Engel (1989), Sturzenegger (1991, 1992, 1994), and
Zou (1993).
At the same time we are also going to discuss the article by Obstfeld and
Rogoff (1983) with the help of Weil (1991) and Sturzenegger (1991,1994) for the
extension to a situation of two monies in the utility function.
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4.2 THE CONTROVERSY
This controversy arose after the publication by Calvo and Rodriguez (1977) of an
article called 'A Model of Exchange Rate Determination under Currency Substitution
and Rational Expectations'. In this model, which was not an optimizing model,' the
authors showed that "an increase in domestic money growth will cause an
immediate depreciation of the currency." (Engel 1989, p. 47) Or conversely, that
a decrease in the rate of growth of domestic money will lead to an appreciation of
the currency.2 In fact, their analysis was due to concerns for what was happening
in Argentina during those years.
Liviatan (1981) argued and showed in his article that "an increase in the rate
of monetary expansion has the impact effect of creating a real appreciation of the
exchange rate and a deterioration of the balance of payments, contrary to the
results of Calvo and Rodriguez." (Liviatan 1987, p. 1218) He showed that this result
'Something noted by Liviatan (1981) in his response to Calvo and Rodriguez
and then certified by Calvo (1985) and Engel (1989) in their respective responses
to Liviatan (1981).
2The original article by Calvo and Rodriguez (1977) concluded that the
exchange rate would vary depending in the monetary experiment, that is to say, the
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) will not hold. The optimizing models by Liviatan
(1981), Calvo (1985), and Engel (1989) show an impact effect over the real
exchange rate but were the long-run real exchange rate remained constant, i.e., the
PPP holds. See Penati (1987) for a model with endogenous (and variable) rates of
time preference where the PPP does not hold, just as in the original Calvo and
Rodriguez (1977) article.
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came from considering both monetary balances, domestic and foreign, to behave
like "cooperant" factors in utility.? Had domestic money and foreign money behaved
like "non-cooperant" factors in utility, then the cross partial derivatives between
domestic and foreign monetary balances would be negative, and the Calvo and
Rodriguez (1977) (henceforth C-R) results would stand.
Calvo's (1985, p.176) article argues further that "the 'cooperancy' assumption
is not a sufficient condition to obtain the anti-C-R result." He says that "an
implication of Liviatan's analysis must be that a slowing down of the rate of
expansion of the money supply is associated with a large enough expansion of the
long-run real wealth so as to call for an increase, not a decrease as in C-R, of the
long-run stock of foreign money." "...We will argue that whether or not C-R results
obtain crucially depends on the elasticity of substitution between consumption and
liquidity services, o61and between the two currencies in the 'production of liquidity',
0
mF." (Calvo 1985, p. 176) These issues will be extremely important later because
our argument will be related to elasticity of substitution between currencies,
although not with elasticity of substitution between consumption and liquidity
services like in Calvo's 1985.
On his own, Engel (1989) tries to show that Liviatan's assumption is
"mistaken." In his words "Liviatan (1981) provides a parallel model to Calvo and
3The "cooperancy" assumption, following Calvo (1985, p.187, note 4) is the
same as being "Edgeworth-complementary" in utility, i.e., the cross partial derivative
of the utility function with respect to the two monies is always positive.
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Rodriguez in which agents' behavior is optimal (rather than described by ad hoc
equations). Liviatan concludes that an increase in domestic money growth leads to
a real appreciation domestically, and thus the Calvo-Rodriguez result is not correct
in a model in which agents optimize. This conclusion depends critically on an
assumption about the nature of the utility of money function. It is argued here that
Liviatan's justification of his assumption is mistaken." (Engel 1989, p. 47)
We think that these issues are important because several articles have use
these conclusions and assumptions to justify their own conclusions and
assumptions.
4.3 "COOPERANCY VERSUS NON-COOPERANCY"
To make our point here we are going to follow Engel's contention of "proof' of what
Liviatan implied by saying "for a given it, m and f should be positively related".
. . "we see immediately that a positive relationship between m and f implies
v,>0." (Liviatan 1981, p.1226). So we are going to reproduce Engel's
demonstration here (Engel 1989,
pp.50-51):4
4See Engel (1989) for a much clear understanding of the equations or look
at the appendix in which we have transcribed such equations.
78
"A good guess about what Liviatan means by this statement is that, if in (3c)
everything except for m and f are held constant (i.e., cT , cH, and n + r ),
then in order for the ratio m- to stay constant while m and f change, vfmf
must be positive. Mathematically, imposing that m- is constant, so that
f
dm = (2-)df, and imposing that dc , dcH , and d(7t + r) equal zero, from
f
equation (4b) we must have (6b) (vf + (-) Vrnn )df= 0 . Since v,, is
negative, Liviatan would conclude that vf is positive.
The problem with this argument is that if equations (3) hold, and the
nominal interest and consumption of the goods cannot change, then there
is no way for demand for either money to change. It is not the terms in
parentheses in (6b) that must be zero, but instead df itself must vanish. The
simplest way to see this is to perform the same exercise on (4a) that was
performed on (4b). We get (6c) (v,+ (2) vf 0. For (6b) and (6c) to
hold simultaneously, df must be zero. So, in Liviatan's exercise, the - ratio
f
is kept constant because m and f themselves do not change. It says
nothing about the correct sign for vfm.
Liviatan claims to be looking for 'a portfolio allocation condition
analogous to condition (6b) in the CR model.' It is argued above that this
condition is achieved by allowing vf to be negative, but perhaps the most
compelling argument that Liviatan chose the wrong sign according to this
guideline is that his conclusions are exactly the opposite of CR."
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Engel's argument is far from convincing and in fact from his explanation the
only thing that we can conclude is that vi can either be positive (cooperant, as
Liviatan argues) or negative, as he himself argues. In Engel's "proof' there is
nothing that could show that the sign of the cross partial derivative between
domestic and foreign balances has any specific sign. The only thing that he shows,
and probably without any doubt, is that is df that must be zero in these equations.
So he cannot conclude, as he does, that the "most compelling argument that
Liviatan chose the wrong sign according to this guideline is that his conclusion are
exactly the opposite of CR." In fact, this is the reason why Liviatan's conclusions
are the opposite of those found by CR. In one model monies are assumed to be
cooperant in utility while in the other monies are assumed to be non-cooperant in
utility. Then, the solution, as argued by Liviatan, will depend on whether one uses
the assumption of cooperancy or of non-cooperancy of real monetary balances in
utility.
4.4 OUR ARGUMENT
Our argument relates to both, the "cooperancy" assumption and the conclusion put
forward by Calvo (1985) that elasticities of substitution play a big role in the
determination of the changes in the exchange rate. We will also use the notion of
the "essentiality" of real monetary balances put forward by Obstfeld and Rogoff
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(1983) and the extension of this condition to two currencies model made by Weil
(1991) and Sturzenegger (1991, 1994).
Nevertheless, first, we want to use the words of caution put forward by
Calvo in his 1985 article that reads (Calvo 1985, p. 185): "and, perhaps more
interestingly, we have learned that in order to get closer to a more operational
theory, we need a deeper understanding of the transactions technologies. Until that
is available, I would advise extreme caution in the application of this, or any other
theory involving currency substitution."
With these words of caution in mind we are then going to proceed with our
demonstration.
Our argument starts with a discussion of the intuition behind the idea of the
"essentiality" of money developed by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1983)(Henceforth, O-R).
They showed that hyperinflations could be avoided by assuming that the
government will "fractionally" back the currency, in a one currency model. In fact,
they argued that, just the possibility of that backing by the government will be
enough to avoid hyperinflations.5 Still, the essentiality of money could be imposed
by legal institutional mechanisms. Let us say, if transacting with the government
requires agents to use domestic balances, that could be considered an institutional
backing of the currency.
'See Calvo (1994) for a recent argument on the U.S. Treasury backing of
the Mexican peso.
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Giovannini and Turtelboom (1992, p. 20) argue that "when inflation reaches
extremely high values, the economy naturally adopts substitutes to the depreciating
currency. And, second, the inflating currency does not completely disappear. This
stubbornest of the hyperinflating money is an unexplored phenomenon. It could be
due both to legal enforcement of its use for some transactions (i.e., taxes to be paid
in cash), and/or to the hysteresis-type of phenomena ... "
The second argument here is that at any moment in time individuals could
go and exchange their money balances for some positive amount of goods and/or
services. From O-R (1983, p. 686) conclusions we read: "if the government
fractionally backs the currency by guaranteeing a minimal real redemption value for
money, the problem of speculative hyperinflation disappears. Even though the
government need never exercise its redemption guarantee, hyperinflationary
equilibria, in which the welfare of all is lower than in the steady-state equilibrium,
are eliminated."
Still, they also argue that (O-R, p. 684) "feasibility of the government's policy
requires that the government have access to sufficient reserves of capital to
purchase the entire money stock M at the support price e. Otherwise, speculative
inflationary paths involving a sudden run on the government's reserves cannot be
excluded."6
6This issue will be of utmost importance when discussing our conclusions
about Argentina's recent policy of "backing" the peso on a one to one fixed parity
with the dollar. However, Calvo (1994) makes a good point on Mexico's situation in
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The above argument is the relationship that links the currency substitution
hypothesis with the real exchange rate determination. This is why the issues of
cooperancy-non-cooperancy between currencies and elasticities of substitution
between currencies come into play. The reason for this importance is the following.
Since the supply of foreign currency depends fundamentally on whether there is a
current account surplus or deficit, consumers know that if there is a run against the
domestic currency (probably due to expectations of unsustainable nominal
exchange rate policy, or due to ever increasing budget deficits financed through
inflation tax, etc.) thus reducing foreign reserves to unsustainable levels, that
governments, sooner rather than later, will have to abandon their nominal exchange
rate policy and devaluate the exchange rate. The intuition behind this conclusion
is that in order to restore reserves through a current account surplus, a nominal
devaluation will produce a real exchange rate depreciation.
But instead of going into the issues of exchange rate determination, we are
going to limit ourselves to the cases where PPP holds.7 However, before going into
the model we still have to explain different issues that will not be covered in this
which he says that "M2 (not including cetes) was more than four times net
international reserves; for Argentina, Chile, Colombia, and Uruguay, this ratio
hovered around two or three. Finally, a more comprehensive measure of short-term
government cum bank obligations like M3 (which includes cetes) was six times
larger than net international reserves." (Calvo 1994, p.302)
'We are only simplifying our analysis to relate to the issues of this chapter,
which are whether currencies are cooperant or non-cooperant factors in utility and
how elasticities of substitution play a role in this analysis.
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chapter but that will be covered in other chapters. First, we are assuming that in a
currency substitution model these currencies are not perfect substitutes between
them." This case will be covered in following chapters. Second, since the supply of
foreign currency depends on the current account, it is therefore obvious that if there
is a surplus, the degree of substitutability between domestic and foreign balances
will increase. However, this degree of substitutability will never be equal to o (the
perfect substitute case), while if there is a deficit, the degree of substitutability will
decrease.
Then let us look at the parameterization made by Weil (1991):
(m 1m2 )t'-
V(ml,m 2 )= a(0,1a- 1
(l -a)
and
=Inm +Inm2 a = 1
He showed that this utility function, "which features a unit elasticity of
substitution between the two currencies--includes both the case in which each
currency is essential (a > 1) and the case in which each is inessential (a = 0) since,
80f course what we are implying is that these two currencies are a domestic
one and a foreign one, one being supplied without cost by the government and
another one which will be supplied only if there is a current account surplus.
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for instance,
limu,, ml Vi = lim,,,n e a (m m2) - = 0
if and only if a < 1." (Weil 1991, p.298) Of course, if a 1 then it follows that these
currencies are essential in utility.
We will see that Calvo's (1985) argument on Liviatan's (1981) conclusion is
well founded. Weil shows that assuming that currencies are essential (a = 1,
although a > 1 will also give us cases where currencies are essential) reduces the
scope for hyperinflationary paths.
But, what can we say about the cross partial derivatives of this function?
What can we say about their sign? By taking derivatives of this function under the
different assumptions we can show that if a = 1 then
av _ 1
ami mi
and
=0
8m 8m2
similarly
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avi
amV 
_ m2
m2 m2
and
=0
8m28m,
This means that domestic monetary balances are independent of foreign
monetary balances. That is to say, domestic and foreign currency balances are not
either cooperant or non-cooperant factors in utility. In this case hyperinflationary
paths are ruled out because any other solution, other than the steady state solution,
violate the transversality condition or the non negativity constraint on money
balances.9
What about the cases where monetary balances are essential but a > 1. Let
us look at the case where a = 2. Then the partial derivatives and the cross partial
between domestic and foreign currencies are
aV 1 >0
mIm2m2
and
90r at least this is the case when using this parameterization.
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-- = - 1 < 0
8m 8m 2  (mrm2) 2
and similarly
___ 1
a _> 0
a2 m2 m
and
a2_V_ 1 <0
8m 28mi ( 2n) 2
which means that as a increases to numbers strictly greater than 1, these
currencies are increasingly becoming substitutes, (or a > 1, ... , 00 , where infinity
is the case for perfect substitution). That is to say, these currencies go from being
independent (a = 1) to being non-cooperant in utility.
But, what about the cases for which 0 < a < 1? As we will show, these are
the cases where the two currencies are cooperant (Edgeworth-complementary) in
utility. This means that if the inflation rate of the domestic currency increases, then
consumers will reduce their demand of both currencies, because (Zou 1993, p. 213)
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"the reduction of peso holdings following a higher peso inflation will reduce the
marginal utility of the liquidity services from the dollar." Let us show this with the
use of the same parameterization. Then if we assume that a = .5 we have
___ in >0
and
a2v + >0
amn18in 2  2 m i 2  fm im2
and similarly
av_ m > 0
and
a2______ 
> 0
am2am1 2 m m2 m m 2
Then, the cross partial derivative being positive means that these two monies are
88
cooperant in utility.
After looking at three different possibilities in terms of the relationship
between the two monetary instruments, whether they are independent from each
other, substitutes or complementary (cooperant) in utility, we could summarize the
following results.
First, if monetary balances are essential ( a > 1), these monetary balances
could be independent from each other ( a = 1), or they could be substitutes, or non-
cooperant factors in utility (a > 1).
Second, if monetary balances are inessential (0 < a < 1) then these
monetary balances are cooperant (Edgeworth-complementary) in utility.
However, we might ask, what does this has to do with the issue of whether
the real exchange rate of a country appreciates or depreciates after an increase in
the growth rate of money? Whether the real exchange rate appreciates or
depreciates after an increase in the rate of growth of the domestic money supply
depends, as Liviatan has argued, on whether the monies are cooperant or non-
cooperant in utility, or whether they are inessential or essential (with the exception
of the case where these two monies are independent but essential.)
Of course, these results are dependent on the type of utility function we are
using. A generalization of these results cannot be made at this moment because we
might find that these results do not hold with a different utility function.
The above argument about monies being essential under these conditions
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is far different from a situation in which the government decides to "back" a new
currency (as in Sturzenegger 1994). In our case, monies are essential by the
decision of the individual consumer acting independently from the government. 10
Therefore, our argument gives independence to the individual consumer to decide
whether the marginal utility of liquidity services decreases (cooperant) when the
growth rate of domestic money is increased or the marginal utility of liquidity
services increases (non-cooperant) when there is an increase in the rate of growth
of domestic currency.
The real issue here is that with currency substitution individual consumers
are able to "endogenize" the changes in the money supply, which is almost always
modeled to be exogenous to them. By this endogeneization, individuals are also
endogenizing the effects of the fiscal deficit of the government, which has been
argued to be one of the characteristics of high inflation, or hyperinflationary
processes to occur.
4.5 CONCLUSION
The main conclusion to this chapter is that there is no "a-priori" presumption about
the relationship between real monetary balances in models of currency substitution.
Whether currencies are "cooperant," "non-cooperant," or "independent" in providing
10See Chapter 7 on this dissertation.
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utility to consumers is something that would have to be resolved within each
different situation and model used.
Probably, the greatest concern about each of these assumptions would be
its relationship with the stability and feasibility of solutions to changes in other
variables and/or shocks to these systems.
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 4
This appendix has the sole and limited purpose of transcribing several necessary
equations used in our arguments in Chapter 4 from an article by Charles Engel
(1989, pp. 49-51). The equations being transcribed from that article have the same
number as when they were published.
(3a) uT(CT,CH) =puH(cT1cH)
(3b) Vf - r + Tu* - -T
T )T
(3c) '" - r + -T
UT UT
(3d) = 0
(4a) vfdf +vfndm = (r+7*)urdcT + (r+7*)uTHdcH +uTd(r+T*)
(4b) vfdf+ v,,dm =(r+-n)udcT + (r+T)uTHdcH +uTd(r+ 7)
(6a) = g(m)
f
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CHAPTER 5
RATIONAL HYPERINFLATION
WITH CURRENCY SUBSTITUTION
5.1 INTRODUCTION
In this chapter we are going to develop a model characterized by introducing two
fiat currencies in the utility function.' The main idea behind this exercise is to look
at the effects of having two currencies over the optimal decision of the government.
But first we will be characterizing the Sidrauski (1967) model with money in
the utility function to include the extension to hyperinflationary situations following
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1983). In order to further simplify the analysis we are going
to assume in this chapter that individuals face a constant, and fixed, rate of time
preference.
'See Weil (1991) and Sturzenegger (1991, 1994) where they make an
extension of Obstfeld and Rogoff (1983).
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5.2 THE SIDRAUSKI MODEL AND HYPERINFLATIONS 2
The problem faced by consumers is the following:
Max V = fu(ct,m,)e -8t dt (5.1.1)
subject to
=y -,- ntm,+ti, (5.1.2)
where ct is individual consumption, m, is real monetary balances, y is the individual
income, m, is the rate of inflation, and ti, is government lump-sum transfers. 3 First
order conditions for this problem are:
uc(c,m) = A (5.1.3)
- + u (cr) (5.1.4)
lim,-- Ae ma , = 0 (5.1.5)
2This analysis is similar to Blanchard and Fischer (1989) and Sturzenegger
(1991, 1994). It is introduced here as an introduction to the two monies model.
3This model is similar to that used in Chapter 3 of this dissertation with the
only difference that the rate of time preference is fixed, and constant.
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We are also have that4
m- =a - (5.1.6)
and
z = om (5.1.7)
where a is the rate of growth nominal money, which means that the government
follows a constant money growth rule.
If we substitute equations (5.1.6) and (5.1.7) into (5.1.1) we get that at
equilibrium, the level of consumption is c, =y. Assuming that the utility function is
separable in consumption and real money balances, and since y is constant, the
marginal utility of consumption is also constant, so . = 0. After normalizing c such
that =u = 1, then equation (5.1.4) becomes
um (m) = 8 + n (5.1.8)
Then, substituting (4.1.6) into (4.1.8) we get
4Time subscripts have been dropped were no conflict arises.
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rh = (5 + a)m - u,,(m)m (5.1.9)
which is a differential equation in m. This equation is unstable. The derivative of
this equation with respect to m near steady state is positive, - u,,,,,, >0. However,
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1983) have shown that the steady state is not the only
equilibrium. They showed that hyperdeflations can be ruled out because they
violate the transversality condition, but the same will not be true for hyperinflations.
We could have "rational" hyperinflations as long as
lim,, - a mu,, (m) = 0 (5.1.10)
even with a constant rate of money growth.
A different situation results if we assume that
lim,, 0mu,,, (m)>0 (5.1.11)
This condition implies that money has to be essential for rational hyperinflations to
be ruled out, or that no amount of consumption can compensate consumers for the
disutility of having zero real monetary balances. Graphically we have:
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Figure 5.1
dm/dt
1
I
I
I
I / A
C K. -
Figure 5.1 shows the cases where conditions (5.1.10) or (5.1.11) are assumed. The
full line shows the case where money is "inessential" in utility (5.1.10) and the
dashed line shows the case where money is "essential" (5.1.11). Real monetary
balance being zero in the first case (at point B) represents the non-monetary
equilibrium. In both cases' hyperdeflations (those points to the right of the steady
state, point A) can be ruled out because they violate the transversality condition.
However, while hyperdeflations can be ruled out, we can not rule out rational
hyperinflations. Assumption (5.1.11) on the contrary, where money is essential in
utility, do rules out hyperinflations by having a negative value for real monetary
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balances, something infeasible, at point C in figure 5.1.
5.3 THE MODEL WITH TWO FIAT CURRENCIES
What happens when the individual has the opportunity to substitute between
currencies, or to use different currencies for making different kind of transactions.
In Argentina, the use of domestic currency during periods of high inflation continued
for small purchases and day to day small economic activities. However, big
purchases, normally for durable goods, were, and are still being made (or at least
quoted), using a different currency, especially US dollars.5
Many authors have argued that the existence of a substitute for a currency
will tend to increase the inflation rate of the domestic currency. Therefore,
governments should try to limit such type of behavior by consumers. However,
there have been exceptions to the view that currency substitution is something that
should be limited. To this respect we could mention Sturzenegger (1991, 1994) and
Rostowski (1992), just to mention some of them. The first of them argues that in
fact, with currency substitution, the rate of inflation of the original currency actually
decreases when the new currency is introduced. The second one looks at the
benefits of currency substitution in providing the correct signals to the economic
5Although there were sectors in society that were transacting in domestic
currency even for the purchase of durable goods through the ASP. See Chapter 2,
Section 2.5.2, entitled Currency Substitution vs. Financial Adaptation.
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system. In his view, the economy can maintain or increase total output during
inflationary situations by using a more stable currency, etc. While Rostowski's
argument is interesting, we will not pursue it further. However, we are going to
pursue Sturzenegger's (1994) argument.
Sturzenegger's (1994) argument goes basically on these lines: "Along the
hyperinflationary path, people are willing to reduce monetary balances because
they expect the inflation rate to increase in the future. If money is 'essential' in the
sense that its marginal utility is very high, then the inflation rate required to induce
people to substitute out of this currency must be very large. If money losses this
'essentiality' property -because a very close substitute develops or becomes
available - then the inflation rate required to sustain a path with declining real
monetary balances falls," (Sturzenegger 1994, p. 387) thus requiring a lower
inflation rate on the original currency.
Let us look at the model with two currencies. The representative consumer
solves the following problem:
Max V = f [u(c) + v(m 1 ,m 2)] e P'dt (5.2.1)
subject to
til + 2 =Y - c -Tr niml - c2m2 + -I + '2 (5.2.2)
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where again mi and m2 are real monetary balances in each currency, 7zI and it2
are the rate of inflation corresponding to each currency, and z1 and i2 are lump-
sum transfers in each currency.
Again, the first order conditions for this problem are
u,(c) = (5.2.3)
v (t(m1, m2) - A 71 - p = 0 (5.2.4)
v, (mim2) - Xn2 - p = 0 (5.2.5)
- i+ P X = (5.2.6)
and
(mi + m2 )X e P' = 0 (5.2.7)
and we also have the constant money supply rule in each currency:
m l = Q t - IT (5 .2 .8 )
i 1
and
100
2 = a2 - n2 (5.2.9)
m2
Proceeding with the corresponding substitutions, similar to those performed
in section (5.1), but in this case for each currency, we get two differential equations
in both real monetary balances:
ii = [I +p -v (Pi ,-m 2 ) ] m1  (5.2.10)
n2 = [a2 + p - V (mI,m2)]m 2  (5.2.11)
We are able to consider the system in two variables, m1 and m2 , because
we are assuming that this utility function is separable in consumption and real
monetary balances. Furthermore, consumers are being lump-sum compensated in
both currencies for the increased opportunity cost of holding real monetary
balances in both currencies.6 That is to say, consumers do not have to give up
consumption in order to acquire any one of these monetary balances. Then these
two equations give us a system in both monies. As Sturzenegger (1994) argues, the
system is completely unstable with two positive eigenvalues. The only equilibrium
solution is at steady state. If condition (5.1.10) is assumed, there are multiple
6In Chapter 6 we deal with a situation in which consumers are only lump-sum
compensated for the effects of domestic inflation but not for the effects in the
foreign inflation rate.
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equilibria with the possibility of rational hyperinflationary paths converging to a
single currency equilibria.
However, before continuing with the case discussed by Sturzenegger (1994)
let us look at the case where these two monetary instruments are perfect
substitutes.7 Philippe Weil (1991) considered this case and his results are shown
in the following proposition:
"Proposition 1. If both (perfectly substitutable) currencies are valued, then the share
in real world balances of the faster growing currency monotonically tends to 100%
in the long run."8 (Weil 1991, p. 294)
Then, he concludes that "removing the obstacles to currency substitution
while maintaining fixed parities must result in the eventual elimination of the slow
growing currency." (Weil 1991, p. 295) This, he argues, is an example of the
Gresham's Law of currency substitution in which "bad" money displaces "good"
money from circulation.
His proof is based on the fact that there is perfect capital mobility and that
7This case was not considered by Sturzenegger (1994) although it would
certainly apply to a situation in which the same government is the one introducing
the new currency in this economy, i.e., the recent case of the Plan Real in Brazil is
an example of this type of policy. However, if the issue is to "back" the currency, in
the sense of applying condition (5.1.11) this could have been achieved just by
backing the original currency without the need of introducing a new currency. See
Chapter 5 in which we discus some issues concerning the backing of the currency
by the government.
8For the proof to this proposition see Weil (1991, p. 295).
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the world interest rate is given. Then, the nominal interest rate must be equal
across countries which, with an interest rate equal to the rate of time preference,
implies that the inflation rate in both countries must be equal. The equality between
inflation rates means that the demand for the faster growing currency must be
increasing, and in the end going to 100% of real monetary balances. This is shown
by point M, in Figure 5.2.
His model is similar to that of Sturzenegger (1994) with the resulting two
differential equations in two monetary balances.9 These two differential equations
are as follows:
1= [ + p], 1 - v'(m +m 2)m (5.2.12)
rm2 = [c2 + p]m2 - v'(ml + m2)n 2  (5.2.13)
If we assume that o > 02, that is to say, that the rate of growth of mi is
greater than the rate of growth of m2 , then we have the following figure:
9Although Weil (1991) is considering the case of two different countries, each
one with their own currency, and perfect capital mobility between these countries.
Furthermore, the level of consumption is not affected by this experiment.
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Figure 5.2
m
2
M2
0
M1 m1
with the solutions to the system depending on whether we assume (5.1 .10) or
(5.1.11) on the monetary equilibrium.10
Then, summarizing Weil's conclusion we have that if (5.1.11) is assumed"
there are three possible outcomes. First, a steady state in which only m, is held,
'
0 The case in which a2 > will give the same result in which the "bad"
currency displaces the "good" currency.
"Remember from Chapter 4 that (5.1.11) implied that real monetary
balances are "essential" in utility and assuming (5.1.10) implied that real monetary
balances are "inessential" in utility.
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at point M in Figure 5.2. Second, a steady state in which only m2 is held, which
is represented by point M2 , and third, a continuum of non-stationary equilibria
which lies in the saddle-path connecting M2 to M, in which the "good" currency is
driven out from circulation.12 If, instead, (5.1.10) is assumed, then with the above-
mentioned solutions there is a fourth solution characterized by hyperinflationary
paths in which both currencies disappear. This solution is shown in Figure 5.2 by
the path ending at the origin and that passes below the path joining M2 to MAl.
Then, if currencies are perfect substitutes, there will be situations in which
there is the possibility of rational hyperinflationary solutions to develop. This point
is extremely important13 because when currencies are no longer perfect substitutes
then, rational hyperinflationary solutions may or may not be possible, depending on
the assumptions we make. 4
We are ready now to continue our discussion of Sturzenegger's (1994)
argument with the important distinction that he is not considering a situation of
perfectly substitutable currencies.
Using equations (5.2.10) and (5.2.11) we get the following Figure 5.3
12See Weil (1991) for a more complete view.
13This point is also stressed by Weil (1991).
"And fundamentally, depending on the utility function used. We will see this
latter on in the chapter.
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Figure 5.3
dm 2 /dt = 0
M,
A
dm,/dt = 0
0 M2 m2
The steady state solution of this model is at point A. What about the
possibility of hyperinflationary solutions? Sturzenergger (1994) argues that if we
assume that m1 is evolving through a hyperinflationary path, and another currency
"backed" by the government is introduced, being this backed currency m2 , that the
rate of inflation of the original currency decreases on the hyperinflationary path.
Furthermore, he says to be working with a utility function characterized by a
Baumol-Tobin-Barro transaction model.
He goes to great lengths to develop a utility function characterized by being
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separable in consumption and real monetary balances and by having negative
cross partial derivatives for both monies." However, what he does not realize is
that although he "imposes" that condition (5.1.11) applies to this utility function that
is not so. Let us take from his utility function the partial derivative with respect to
m 16
For (5.1.11) to apply we require that the limit of
_v _ 2k + 2k 2 mn
11 i _(2ml + ni 2)(2m, + m2 + k + k2 m )
times m1 when m1 goes to zero and m2 goes to a constant to be different from
zero.17 However, we see immediately that this limit is equal to zero, not different
from zero. Thus this parametrization, although produces negative cross partial
derivatives between the two monetary balances (thus monetary balances are "non-
cooperant" in utility), it does not fulfill condition (5.1.11) which is central to his
argument.
Another point which is also central to his argument is the one that relates to
1 See Chapter 4 for a discussion on the differences between the assumptions
of "cooperancy" and "non-cooperancy" of real monetary balances.
16 See Sturzenegger (1994) p. 382.
17Mathematically:
lim m Cv (mi, m2)>0
107
the assumption that "while one currency is evolving through a hyperinflationary
path, another currency "backed" by the government is introduced."(Sturzenegger
1994, p. 385) He argues that if the government introduces a new currency while the
original currency is evolving through a hyperinflationary path, the inflation rate of
the original currency must be lower because this money is losing its essentiality due
to the introduction of the second currency. This argument seems to infer that the
first money was "essential" in the first place which contradicts the argument that this
essential money was suffering a hyperinflation. If m was essential (i.e., condition
[5.1.11] was assumed at the beginning for the original currency), then mi could not
have been suffering a speculative hyperinflation in the first place.1'
Blanchard and Fischer (1989, pp.244-45) argued this point in the following
way: "Does the government have any way of avoiding hyperinflations? One
institutional provision is "backing" of the currency. If the government provides a
promise that one unit of currency can be exchanged at positive real value for goods
(if goods are perishable, for a stream of goods), there cannot be hyperinflation. The
reason is that under hyperinflation the price of money would eventually be low
enough that individuals would exchange their money against goods with the
government. From then on, the price of money could not decrease further. But if
there cannot be hyperinflation from that time on, there cannot be hyperinflation
"See Chapter 7 for an extension to this argument.
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before that time either."19
Then, point A on Figure 5.3 is the only steady state solution for this system.
Any other solution will violate "either the transversality condition or the non-
negativity on prices," (Weil 1991, p. 298) if we assume that money is "essential" for
utility, which is assuming (5.1.11) in the monetary equilibrium. However, if we
assume (5.1.10), which is the condition that money is not essential in utility, then
we could have rational hyperinflationary paths ending in a single currency or
hyperinflationary paths without any currency, which is again the non-monetary
equilibrium. These solutions are shown by the paths ending at Ml, M2, and 0
(which is the origin), respectively, in Figure 5.3. We see here that using
Sturzenegger's (1994) utility function, instead of Weil's, imperfect substitutability
between currencies does not "reduce the scope for hyperinflationary equilibria"
(Weil 1990, p. 300), as was argued by Weil.20
Weil's conclusion that imperfect substitutability reduces the scope for
hyperinflationary equilibria is directly related to the parametrization used in his
analysis.
Let us now increase the rate of growth of mi (an increase in a, ). Then the
19There is another way in which the government can avoid hyperinflations,
which is also considered by Blanchard and Fischer, which is called the "feedback
rule." See Blanchard and Fischer (1989) for further details.
20See Weil (1990) and Chapter 4 of this dissertation.
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dn 1 = 0 line will shift downwards, and since both monies are jump variables, the
dt
system will achieve its new equilibrium at higher holdings of m2 and lower holdings
of m1 22 or point B on Figure 5.4.
Figure 5.4
dm 2 /dt = 0
dm /dt = 0
- B Y
dm,'/dt = 0
0 
m2
Sturzenegger calls this outcome, [that of an increase in the holdings of m2 and a
2
'This point is important because if there are two monetary balances, one
domestic and another one foreign, only the domestic money will be a jump variable,
the foreign being determined by the surplus or deficits in the current account, or on
the balance of payments if there is no capital mobility.
22We are assuming, for now, that the cross partial between both monetary
balances is negative.
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reduction in the holdings of m, (from point A to point B in Figure 5.4) across steady
state] the workings of a "Gresham's Law in reverse: across steady states, good
money displaces bad." (Sturzenegger 1994, p. 385) However, the only thing that is
happening here is that the opportunity cost of holding m1 has increased (relative
to that of holding m2) and the rational individual chooses to hold a higher level of m2
and a lower level of mi,. It has nothing to do with any type of Gresham Law.2 3
This will be shown later when we assume that real monetary balances are
"cooperant"24 in utility. If real monetary balances are "cooperant" in utility, then an
increase in the rate of growth of m1 will decrease holdings of both monies, not only
those of m. Heng-Fu Zou has also stressed this point (1993).
Although the "cooperancy" assumption has been criticized in the literature,
it still has some intuitive, albeit real, importance. The fact that full dollarization has
never occurred in the Latin American countries experiencing currency substitution
can be partially explained by assuming that monetary balances are "cooperant" in
utility. Of course, institutional provisions may also be at the heart of this outcome.
However, one of the most important arguments in favor of the "cooperancy"
assumption could be the fact that there are some purchases (mostly small, day to
231f we look back at the case explained by Weil, the case when monies were
perfect substitutes (Figure 5.2), then we can talk of a type of Gresham Law of
currency substitution, as Weil himself does. This is the case where the "bad" money
displaces the "good" money (i.e., going from M2 to point M, in Figure 5.2).
24Recall from Chapter 4 that the "cooperancy" assumption implied positive
cross partial derivatives between real monetary balances, instead of negative.
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day purchases) that are always conducted in the depreciating or (hyper)inflating
currency (and that this hyperinflating currency does not disappear completely)
whether big purchases are at least quoted (if not conducted) in some other
secondary currency?25 Geographical issues and the lack of financial integration in
less developed countries can give also some account of the limits to full
dollarization. Financial adaptation is another reason that full dollarization has not
occurred in Argentina.2
5.4 CONCLUSION
So far we have analyzed the cases where the same country creates a secondary
currency, presumably with no capital mobility or with imperfect capital mobility. We
have also looked at the case where there is perfect capital mobility (and
presumably no risk in holding the high rate of growth currency), in which case if
both monies are valued, there is the possibility of facing a type of Gresham Law of
25Sturzenegger (1992) argues that there are transaction costs that make the
change to a "foreign" currency only profitable for high income individuals. But we
can also argue that a 10% monthly inflation of a one dollar purchase will have
different effects than a 10% monthly inflation over the purchase of a house or a car,
or for that matter of any large purchase, in terms of money, or what is called the
income elasticity of money. Furthermore, the difference need not be that between
tradables and non-tradables, for which foreign money and domestic money are
used, respectively, as several authors have argued.
2 See Chapter 2 where we give several possible reasons for this outcome.
See section 2.5.2 on Currency Substitution vs. Financial Adaptation.
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currency substitution in which the slow growing currency disappears from
circulation.
Nevertheless, the important issue in this chapter relates to the characteristic
of this second currency. If the currency is acquired through a current account
surplus (or a balance of payments surplus, when capital is completely immobile)
then, this second currency will not be a jump variable. That is to say, the currency
cannot jump instantaneously to attain the new equilibrium. This is true when the
country, or the individual consumers must sacrifice consumption to acquire these
foreign monetary balances.
Figure 5.5
mI dm 2/dt
dm1/dt
A'
dm'/dt
B
0 m2
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Figure 5.5 shows the case in which these two monetary balances are cooperant in
utility. If there is an increase in the rate of growth of the domestic currency (m, )
then the system jumps from point A to point B because in this case these two
monetary balances are jump variables.
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CHAPTER 6
DOLLARIZATION IN ARGENTINA:
COOPERANT OR NON-COOPERANT MONETARY BALANCES?
6.1 INTRODUCTION
In Chapter 5 we argued that with two currencies, the possibilities for instability to
occur increases as the government increases the rate of growth of one of the
currencies because agents could use the second currency. These models, or at
least some of them, have also assumed that agentss are lump-sum compensated
for the effects of the inflation tax. That is to say, agents are being compensated for
the effects of the increased opportunity cost of holding real monetary balances.
However, although we could easily assume that the representative agent is being
lump-sum compensated by the domestic government for the opportunity cost of
holding real domestic monetary balances, a different issue arises when one of the
currencies is a foreign one and the domestic agent is not being compensated by the
foreign government for holding this currency. In fact, this issue could be also put
forward as another reason we may assume that these currencies are cooperant in
utility, i.e., the cross partial derivative between the two monies is positive, and why
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full dollarization has not taken place in the presence of extreme levels of inflation
(hyperinflation).
As Engel (1989) pointed it out, the reason for using the assumption of a zero
foreign inflation rate in some models was due to the argument that the foreign
inflation rate (that of the U.S. dollar) has been normally negligible in comparison to
the rate of inflation of developing countries. Thus, the foreign inflation rate has been
assumed to equal zero. Although this assumption is normally considered to be just
a simplifying one, there have been some periods in recent U.S. history in which the
inflation rate has been in the double digits. Although it may be negligible compared
to the inflation taking place in Argentina for some recent high or hyperinflationary
periods, holding foreign money balances becomes nevertheless relatively more
costly as individuals increase their holdings of U.S. dollars, be it because of a
higher domestic inflation rate or because increases in GDP per capita.
What is even much more interesting is the fact that there is a tradeoff
between increasing the amount of real foreign monetary balances and consumption.
That is to say, if the rate of growth of the domestic currency increases and domestic
and foreign balances are non-cooperant in utility, consumption must be sacrificed
in order to increase the holdings of foreign balances.
The above argument will help us in our conclusions that Argentina should not
totally dollarize its economy because there is some level of foreign monetary
holdings for which the individual agent would decrease the holdings of both, the
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domestic currency and the foreign one after an increase in the rate of growth of
money supply, knowing that he is being lump-sum compensated for holding the
domestic currency while he is not being compensated for holding the foreign one,
and knowing, of course, that he has to continuously sacrifice consumption to
increase its foreign real monetary balances.
A very low inflation rate in Argentina, with agents being lump-sum
compensated for the inflation tax would presumably push agents to hold their
monetary balances in domestic currency instead of foreign currency. However, this
is not what is happening, and probably the reason has to be found in the lack of
credibility in the continuity of the fixed parity between the peso and the dollar.
This lack of credibility could explain Argentina's "segmented" currency
markets. In an interesting article, Aldo A. Arnaudo (Fundaci6n Mediterrenea
Newsletter, August 1994) argues that this segmentation is shown by the existence
of excess reserves in the dollar market while "the peso market has been in
equilibrium in the sense that the demand for peso loans has been satisfied with
available peso deposits." (Arnaudo 1994, p. 6) The Converibility Law conveys that
if there are excess reserves in one currency, financial institutions could convert
these excess reserves to the other currency in order to satisfy demand for that
currency. However, expectations of possible devaluations and or the risk involved
in these transactions has to be assumed by the same institutions. The difference
in the interest rate paid for pesos and for dollars in the financial system gives some
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account of this segmentation.
This market segmentation for dollars and for pesos provides a good
explanation for the "systematic gap between interest rates in the two markets, which
is around 10% annually." (Arnaudo 1994, p. 7) He continues saying that: "The
credibility of policies, or the reduction of economic uncertainty, is reflected in a
number of indicators of behavior of economic agents locally and abroad. With
regard to local agents these factors are reflected in their desire to hold deposits in
dollars with lower remuneration and to borrow in pesos. With respect to foreign
agents these considerations are reflected in the premiums charged to hold
Argentine bonds listed in foreign stock exchanges and the classification of
Argentina's country risk by international firms." (Arnaudo 1994, p. 7)
These are the characteristics of the development of the financial markets
after the Convertibility Law of 1991. It basically shows that there has been an
increase in the demand for domestic loans and an oversupply of dollars in the
market, which is to say, the demand for dollar loans has decreased relative to the
demand for peso loans.
This development shows that there is still a lack of credibility in the
maintenance of the fixed exchange rate. That is to say, agents' expectations are
that the government will not be able to maintain this parity. This means that
individuals are suspicious of the government and are not willing to get into long
term debt (or even short term debt) in dollars. Banks, on the other hand, will not
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extend their offerings of loans denominated in dollars because of expectations and
of higher risk in the future. Or for that matter, banks are unwilling to convert their
dollar deposits into pesos to be able to satisfy demand for loans in pesos as the
Convertibility Law of 1991 stipulates.
6.2 TRADE-OFF BETWEEN HOLDING FOREIGN MONETARY
BALANCES AND CONSUMPTION
It has normally been assumed that there are transaction costs of holding foreign
monetary balances as compared to the costs of holding domestic monetary
balances. Moreover, that there are transaction costs of changing from domestic to
foreign monetary balances. But we have never concentrated on the costs in terms
of forgone consumption that individuals in particular, and countries in general, must
incur when deciding to hold an increased proportion of their monetary holdings in
foreign balances.' Higher income individuals will also pay a higher price, in terms
of consumption, for holding higher foreign monetary balances as their income
increases and as domestic and foreign inflation also increases.
This forgone consumption has two components: the first one is a transitory
component, i.e., from one steady-state to the new steady state through a current
account surplus (a surplus in the balance of payments if there is no capital
'Although the issue has been discussed before by Engel (1989), Zou (1993)
and others.
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mobility)2 in order to get the required foreign balances; the second will be given by
an overall reduction in future consumption due to the effects of foreign inflation and
an increased level of foreign monetary balances in the portfolio of individuals.3
We saw in Chapter 5 that substituting away from one money to the other
entailed no change in consumption due to the increase holdings of the second
currency. This was so because agents were lump-sum compensated for the
increased opportunity cost of holding those balances.' But fundamentally so
because these two monetary balances were both jump variables (i.e., the system
will move immediately to the new equilibrium without any other effect or change in
consumption). However, this is not, in general, the behavior of these two variables
(foreign and domestic monetary balances). In order for a country like Argentina to
2In Chapter 3 of this dissertation we had the case of an increase in the rate
of inflation which produced a balance of payments deficit with no capital mobility.
Agents were lump-sum compensated for the increased opportunity cost of inflation
and when agents were holding only domestic monetary balances and the
government was "indexing" the domestic currency to foreign reserves. However,
Obstfeld (1981) showed that when there is perfect capital mobility and agents were
allowed to hold foreign assets and at the same time government reserves were
allowed to earn interest, which were later returned to the public in form of transfer
payments, an increase in the rate of growth in the money supply will generate a
current account surplus in order for the country to restore its reserves. See Obstfeld
(1981) for further details.
3Although this is only true when we assume that monetary balances are non-
cooperant in utility.
'This was not the case in the model presented by Weil (1991) were
consumers were not assumed to be lump-sum compensated for the increased
opportunity cost of holding those monetary balances but where an increase in any
of the monetary balances entailed no change in consumption now or in the future.
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increase its holdings of foreign currency the economy must generate a current
account surplus (a balance of payments surplus if capital is immobile) in order to
generate those desired foreign balances. Of course, this is true if these monetary
balances are non-cooperant in utility. However, if monetary balances are cooperant
in utility, an increase in the rate of growth of the domestic currency will produce a
current account deficit and furthermore, it will increase the targeted long run level
of consumption in the future.
Let us look at this issues using a model similar to those used in previous
chapters but were foreign monetary balances are acquired through a current
account surplus and consumers are not lump-sum compensated for the opportunity
cost of holding real foreign monetary balances.
6.3 TWO MONIES AGAIN: A FOREIGN AND A DOMESTIC ONE
The issues discussed in the previous section are so far the best rationale for the
assumption that these two monetary balances could be, at least for some levels of
consumption (or for some level of income), cooperant in utility. Let us look, then, at
a model characterized by having a domestic and a foreign money in the utility
function in which agents are lump-sum compensated for the increase in the
opportunity cost of holding domestic monetary balances but they are not
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compensated for holding the foreign monetary balances.
Then, consumers maximize the following function
Max V= f[u(c) +v(mf)]e-P' t (6.1)
subject to
a=y+i -c-7tm -7tff (6.2)
and
a=f+rm (6.3)
where m is the domestically supplied currency and f is the foreign currency. t is
again the government lump-sum transfers in domestic currency. a is the stock of
assets while a is the flow of assets for the individual agent. The nominal exchange
rate is assumed to be fixed.
Again, the first order conditions for this problem are
u A(c) = X (6.4)
v(m,f) - X7t - =0 (6.5)
Vf(m,f) - XA f - p = 0 (6.6)
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- + p= p(6.7)
and
lim,- a a e 't = 0 (6.8)
and we also have the condition for the constant growth of the domestic money
supply
-=a-7c (6.9)
while foreign balances will be acquired through a trade surplus.
Substituting (6.7) into (6.5) and (6.6) and assuming that we are at steady
state (i.e., rim = 6 =f = 0) and furthermore, since at steady state o = n from (6.9) we
get the following equations
v,(m f) - u'(c) (a + p) = 0 (6.10)
v (mf) - u'(c) (nf+ p) = 0 (6.11)
and from the budget constraint we get a third equation
y-c-7f=0 (6.12)
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Let us first totally differentiate the system (6.10)-(6.12) to do some
comparative statics on the effects of an increase in the rate of growth of the
domestic of money.
Then, totally differentiating (6.10)-(6.12) we get 5
-u"(c)(o + p) Vmm V f de u'(c)(do + dp)
-u"(c)(1T+P) v,, vff dm = u'(c)(drt+dp) (6.13)
-1 0 -x df fdf- dy
The determinant of this matrix is
A=v m- v,,Vff+u"(c)nf[( +P)v,,,- (u+P)v,,,,]<0 (6.14)
Using Cramer's rule we get the following results
dm _ -u '(c) [v+u"(c)7(o+p)]<0 (6.15)
d f° -u'(c) vmf > 0 (< 0) ; f f 0~ (v f>O0) (6.16)do A
dc - u!(c) 7rfv ( f <0 (>0); if v,,<0 (v,,>0) (6.17)
do - A n tn
5This is similar to Zou's (1993) analysis.
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These results show how important is the distinction between cooperancy and non-
cooperancy of monetary balances.
When domestic and foreign monetary balances are cooperant in utility, a
higher rate of growth of the domestic money will reduce real domestic monetary
balances while reducing holdings of foreign monetary balances. This implies, by
looking at (6.17), that consumption will be higher at the new steady state because
consumers will be holding fewer foreign monetary balances (remember that there
is a trade-off between consumption and foreign monetary balances). At the same
time they are lump-sum compensated due to the increase in the opportunity cost
of holding domestic monetary balances.
On the other hand, if domestic and foreign monetary balances are non-
cooperant in utility, then, consumption will decrease and foreign monetary balances
will increase in the new steady state.
But let us analyze the possible dynamics of this system. To do that, it is
easier to reduce the number of dynamic equations to two. Then, we are going to
use the following equations:
c = v"(if) + (o + p) (6.18)
11"(c) U"(C)
f=y - c - Cf (6.19)
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Then we have:
ac ac
ac 8f (a + p)
- u "c) (6.20)
ac 8f
The determinant is:
determinant = - tf(a + p) - < 0 (6.21)
u "(c)
In this case it does not matter whether the monies are cooperant or non-cooperant,
the determinant will always be negative.
The trace is:
trace = (a + p) - 7rf > 0 (6.22)
which can almost always be assumed to be positive.
However, the system will be characterized by two possibilities, and in this
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case these possibilities will depend on the sign of the cross partial derivative
between the two monetary balances, i.e., whether they are cooperant or non-
cooperant in utility.
Let us look at the slope of the e = 0 and 1= 0 curves. Then, the slope of
these two curves is given by
ac
slope of c = 0 ; - f = v" > 0 (< 0) ; if v,< 0 (>0) (6.23)
ac iu"T(c)(o + p)
ac
slope of f = 0 ; - = - 7f < 0 (6.24)
8c
Then, if vmf <0, we have:
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Figure 6.1
C dc /dt =0
< dc'/dt = 0
df /dt = 0/
f
Figure 6.1 shows how an increase in the rate of growth of domestic money shifts
the e = 0 to the right and creates a trade surplus (current account surplus or
balance of payments surplus if capital is not mobile) in order for the country to get
the necessary higher foreign balances. That is to say, in order for a surplus to take
place we need the exchange rate to depreciate.
It is also shown that consumption overshoots its new long run level. So, if
currencies are non-cooperant in utility, consumption is not only lower in the new
steady state but it is even lower in the transition from the original steady state to the
new steady state.
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If these monetary balances are cooperant in utility, the dynamics are
different. Let us see how will the system behave if we assume that vf > 0. Figure
6.2 gives us the picture:
Figure 6.2
C
df /dt = 0
dc'/dt = 0
dc/dt=0
f
Figure 6.2 shows the case where currencies are cooperant in utility. An
increase in the rate of growth of the domestic money shifts the c = 0 upwards to
c = 0. Since the system shows saddle path stability, just as before, we have the
following.
Agents will want to get rid of the excess foreign monetary balances and the
only way (other than throw them away) for them to do this is through a current
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account deficit, by which individuals increase their consumption levels in exchange
for foreign monetary balances.
But what happens if there is a decrease in the rate of growth of the domestic
money? If monetary balances are cooperant in utility, the system will create a
current account surplus in order for agents to get accumulate foreign monetary
balances. At the same time, domestic monetary balances will also increase during
the transition. Consumption will decrease in the new steady state due to the trade-
off between holding foreign monetary balances and consumption.
If monetary balances are non-cooperant in utility and there is a decrease in
the rate of growth in the domestic money supply there will be a current account
deficit while consumers decrease their foreign monetary holdings and increase their
domestic monetary holdings.
However, this is not the only possibility. the above mentioned example is
only true if foreign inflation is very high. If foreign inflation is very low, the system
behaves in a different fashion.
This case is characterized by a spiral type of behavior in which the country
will expreience a succession of current account deficits followed by current account
surpluses, and so forth, until the system reaches the new equilibrium steady state.
This type of dynamics is called a "stable focus." Figure 6.3 shows the dynamics of
this system.
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Figure 6.3
C d /dt = 0
df /dt = 0
dc'/dt = 0
f
This figure exemplifies the case when monetary balances are cooperant in
utility and when the foreign inflation rate is low.
6.4 Conclusion
The title of this chapter is Dollarization in Argentina: Cooperant or Non-Cooperant
Monetary Balances?, and not Currency Substitution in Argentina. The reason for
this is that the process analyzed in this chapter is the process of accumulation or
decumulation of foreign monetary balances, not of currency substitution, which is
the last stage in the process of dollarization (Calvo and Vegh, 1992).
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In order for currency substitution to exist, a country must have had a process
of accumulation of foreign monetary balances (in our case of dollarization) that
enable agents at some point in time to determine whether they are going to use
foreign monetary balances to conduct economic transactions. Then, at least in the
case of Argentina, the issue of cooperancy-non-cooperancy has to be analyzed in
this context and not on the context of currency substitution. That is to say, whether
agents increase or decrease their holdings of foreign monetary balances as a store
of value is largely independent from the decision of using those balances for
transaction processes. Of course, currency substitution is not possible if it has not
been preceeded by a process of dollarization through the years. However, whether
agents use those balances for transaction purposes depends on different variables
like institutional provisions, legal requirements, existence of capital markets,
financial integration of the country (i.e., homogeneous access to foreign monetary
balances), etc.
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CHAPTER 7
CURRENCY SUBSTITUTION IN ARGENTINA: INTRODUCING
AN INDEXED CURRENCY OR ENDOGENOUS MONEY SUPPLY?
So far we have analyzed in Chapter 6 how is it that Argentines have been hoarding
or accumulating foreign monetary balances through the years. We have also seen
how the distinction between cooperant or non-cooperant monetary balances
affected this decumulation-accumulation process. However, in this chapter we are
going to look at the same distinction (cooperant vs. non-cooperant) but in a very
different setting. The model introduced here has the characteristic of allowing
agents to decide, independently from the government, whether to increase or
decrease real monetary balances in both currencies. But before doing that we have
to distinguish between two different types of hyperinflationary processes.
7.1 Two Strands of Hyperinflation
It is hardly unlikely that Argentina's hyperinflationary experiences have been a
consequence of "speculative" processes (i.e., "rational hyperinflations"), or what
has been called a "bubble in the price level." However, Sturzenegger (1994) argues
that two such bubbles have been found for the periods 89:3-89:7 and 89:11-90:3.
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This type of hyperinflation assumes that the rate of growth of the money
supply is constant, something uncharacteristic of the money supply growth pattern
in Argentina for the last 40 to 50 years.
This "rational hyperinflation" has the characteristic also that the
hyperinflating currency, in our case the domestic currency, if it is not essential in
utility, disappears from circulation. Since this outcome has not occurred in
Argentina, a different explanation may be at the heart of this hyperinflationary
process. In fact, the way in which foreign monetary balances are accumulated-
decumulated may prevent this economy to totally dollarize.
The second type or strand of hyperinflation is the one that occurs when there
is a continuous growth in the money supply, in which case the rate of inflation
closely follows the growth rate of the money supply. In this case, the domestic
money need not disappear from circulation, even in the presence of a
hyperinflationary process. This process, we argue, closely resembles the
hyperinflationary processes characteristic of the Argentine pattern.
The following charts tries to look at the relationship between the growth rate
of inflation and the rate of growth of money supply for two different periods.
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These charts are only introduced in order to convey that before 1974 the
relationship between the rate of inflation and the rate of growth of the nominal
money supply was extremely different from that found after 1975. We have
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excluded the rate of inflation and the rate of nominal money growth for 1989 and
1990 on purpose because its inclusion will distort the relationship between these
two variables. In order to look at our argument we proceeded to perform some
regressions.
Three regressions were performed in order to look at this trend. The first two
regressions comprises the period from 1956 to 1974. The second period goes from
1975 to 1994. This division was made due to the fact that the behavior between the
growth rate of the money supply and the growth rate of inflation presents a striking
difference between these two periods.
The dependent variable will be the rate of inflation (CPI) and the
independent variable is the rate of growth of the nominal money supply (NM1).
These are simple regressions, just to show the relationship between these two
variables during these two periods. The results are the following:
The first regression is for the period 1956-1974: CPI regressed on NM1.
Constant 8.492364 9.5220802 0.9188367 0.3710
NM1 0.7417828 0.2661415 2.7871741 0.0126
R-Squared 0.313640 Mean of Dependent Var. 31.84211
Adj. R-Sq. 0.273266 IS.D. of Dependent Var. 23.99484
E. of Reg. 20.45529 Sum of Squared Resid. 7113.124
Log Likelih. -83.24978 IF-Statistic 7.768339
D.W. Stat. 1.645586 Prob F-Statistic 0.12642
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Since the Adjusted R-Squared was extremely low we decided to include a
lag in the growth of the money supply. The results were the following:
Constant 21.978772 9.1622352 2.3988439 0.0299
NM1 1.2265432 0.2811786 4.3621505 0.0006
NM1(-1) -0.9719219 0.3221549 -3.0169397 0.0087
R-Squared 0.562640 Mean of Dependent Var. 32.86667
Adj. R-Sq. 0.504326 S.D. of Dependent Var. 24.25907
S.E. of Reg. 17939 Sum of Squared Resid. 4375.583
Lo kelih. -4.8170 F-StatisticI1.6356
D.tat. 1.6620894 Prob F-Statistic 0.002024
Next we proceeded to perform the same regression for the period 1975-1994
and the results were completely different. The Adjusted R-Squared increased to .99
for this period, compared to an Adjusted R-Squared of .27 and .50 for the period
1956-1974. The complete results were the following:
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. . . . . . . .:...::.: . . . .... . . * *~** **** *~ * *** ~ *** ..... ** *
Constant 12.796620 24.443932 0.5235091 0.6070
NM1 1.0381425 0.0217825 47.659399 0.0000
R Sur 10.918 Ma of Dependent Var. 5920
Adj. R-Sq. 0.991701 S.D. of Dependent Var. 1085.586
S.E. of Reg. 98.89592 Sum of Resid. 176047.3
Log Likelih. 1-119.2065 JF-Statistic 12271.418
D.W. Stat. 2.207641 Prob F-Statistic 0.000000
7.2 Rational Hyperinflation: Introducing An Indexed Currency
Sturzenegger (1994) has shown that the introduction of an indexed currency while
the original currency is experiencing a hyperinflation reduces the rate of inflation
in the new equilibrium. However, there are some problems with this analysis. We
are now going to analyze this problems in further detail.'
We are going to use equations (5.2.10) and (5.2.11) for this analysis. We
introduce them here to proceed with our analysis. Then we have two equations
given by:2
1 In Chapter 4 we gave an introduction to this issue.
2See Sturzenegger (1994) for further details.
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ri = [a p + P - V,,(m 1 ,m 2)] n (52.10)
rm2 = [a2 +P ~ v,, (mi,m 2)]m 2  (5.2.11)
These equations give us a dynamic system in two variables, m, and m2 . The
system is completely unstable with the only solution to it being at steady state.
Graphically we have:
Figure 7.1
mi
dmi/dt (m2 = 0)= 0
dm 2/dt = 0
dm1/dt (m2 = m2*)= 0
7 ~dm 1/dt= 01n t
dm,/dt m2* m2
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Sturzenegger (1994) argues that if we assume that the government
introduces an indexed currency, m2 , while the original currency, mi, is evolving
through a hyperinflationary path, that the rate of inflation required to reduce
monetary balances of the original currency is reduced, thus reducing the rate of
inflation for the original currency.
He argues that this is shown by looking at the slope of the - curve, that
mi
is to say, "the slope of the line that starting at the origin goes through a particular
point in the n = 0 curve." (Sturzenegger 1994, p. 386) This slope increases if real
monetary balances are above m,* and decreases in absolute value if real monetary
balances are below mi* . Thus the inflation rate decreases as the economy moves
to its new equilibrium at point c. However, there are two problems here. The first
one is that, although his analysis is correct, nothing prevents these monetary
balances for mi to continue in its hyperinflationary path since point c is not a
steady state solution. That is to say, after the initial reduction in the rate of inflation, mi
can continue to suffer a hyperinflation, which means that after an initial drop in the
inflation rate, from the initial situation to point c, the economy will suffer a new
hyperinflation for which the rate of inflation will continuously increase as monetary
balances for the original currency go to zero. This could also be an explanation to
what happened in Argentina between these two periods (89:3-89:7 and 89:11-90:3).
Of course, this will be only true if we agree that the Argentine government
introduced an indexed currency between the first and the second episode of
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hyperinflation, which is not the case for Argentina.
The second problem with this analysis is the notion that "speculative"
hyperinflations can arise when we have an "essential" currency. If m was essential,
then, speculative or rational hyperinflations could not arise in the first place. This
tends to confirm our position that Argentina's hyperinflation was of the second kind
or strand, it was not a speculative hyperinflation in the first place.
We showed in Chapter 5 that even a Baumol-Tobin-Barro quadratic utility
function in real monetary balances used by Sturzenegger (1994) did not allow us
to impose condition (5.1.11) to the monetary equilibrium. However, we should not
discount the possibility of finding a different utility function that will allow us to have
the same nice characteristics assumed by Sturzenegger (1994). Furthermore,
Argentina's situation is not that of a government introducing an indexed currency
to reduce the rate of inflation of the original currency. In Argentina, individual
agents have been hoarding, or accumulating foreign real monetary balances to
minimize the effects of a government that has been financing the deficit through
money creation. This issue further allow us to believe that domestic monetary
balances continue to be essential, at least legally, in the presence of high inflation,
or even hyperinflation.
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7.3 The Case Of Argentina: Essential Monetary Balances
As we argued before, Argentineans have been accumulating foreign monetary
balances through the years. Furthermore, starting approximately in the 1970s the
country experienced a phenomenon called currency substitution by which some
purchases were being performed, or at least quoted using the U.S. dollar instead
of the domestic currency. At the beginning, durable goods transactions, such as the
purchase of real estate and other durable goods, were performed or at least quoted
using foreign currency. As time went by and as the rate of inflation increased, a
higher number of transactions became a part of this dollar market.
In Argentina's case, individual agents started to use the foreign currency as
a medium of exchange, not only as a unit of account or as a store of value as
described in previous chapters. The Argentine government did not choose to
introduce this alternative currency so as to decrease the rate of inflation of the
original, domestic currency.
7.3.1 The Model With Essential Monetary Balances
In order to make our point, which will try to introduce the workings of the
Convertibility Law of 1991, we are going to specialize our utility function. But first,
we are going to set up the general model and make the assumptions that
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characterizes this Law.
Individual agents once again solve the following maximizing problem:
Max V= f-[u(cf) + v(m)] e P dt (7.1)
subject to
a=m +f =y-c -m-7ff+z (7.2)
and
a = m +f (7.3)
First order conditions for this maximization problem are given by:
uc(c,f) = A (7.4)
v'(m)-X n- p=0 (7.5)
Uf (Cf) - A f - p = 0 (7.6)
-A + P= p(7.7)
and
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lim,_ a), e "' = 0 (7.8)
and we also have the condition for the constant growth of the domestic money
supply
m
-=a-n (7.9)
The implication here is that after the Convertibility Law, the Argentine
Government lost its control over the money supply due to the fact that domestic
money supply depends on the level of reserves on a one-to-one basis with the
dollar.
The parametrization used here is the following:
Max [ (cf)' - + in m e -Pdt (7.10)
M7 (1 - a)
subject to
a=,r +f=y -c -1m -Tff +r (7.11)
and
a=rm+f (7.12)
where t = nm, that is to say, agents are being lump-sum compensated for the
opportunity cost of holding domestic real monetary balances.
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First order conditions for this maximization problem are:
= X (7.13)
Ca
- = 0 (7.14)
c - - = 0 (7.15)
f
- ? + P X = p (7.16)
and
lim, a X e - t = 0 (7.17)
As we argued before, this utility function includes the convenient case that
when a> 1, consumption and foreign monetary balances are substitutes in utility,
that is to say, the cross partial derivative between consumption and foreign
monetary balances is negative. This is necessary because the only way agents can
increase their holdings of foreign balances is by giving up consumption.
Again, proceeding with the corresponding substitutions, and using the
previous assumption on the growth rate of domestic monetary balances we get an
equation on domestic monetary balances and an equation on the accumulation of
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foreign monetary balances. Then, we get the following:
= (a+ P)M- 1 (7.18)
and
f=.y -c - off (7.19)
Then we get:
= (a+ P)M- 1 (7.18)
-(
and since from (7.13) A = 1 , then c =f and substituting into (7.19) we get the
second dynamic equation of the model in terms of f :
1 -a
f=y -f 'x -Tuff (7.19')
This parametrization has the characteristic that the level of foreign monetary
balances will depend only on the level of income and on consumption. At the same
time, domestic inflation will not affect the holdings of foreign monetary balances.
Let us see the graph representing these equations:
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Figure 7.2
m dfldt=o
1/(a+ ) B D dmdt = O
1(6' + p) dm' dt = 0
R' R y= p f
1 -a
were p =f + xrf, a constant, and R are reserves on the possession of the
Central Bank amounting to the domestic money supply.
In this case, rational, speculative hyperinflations will not be possible because
domestic monetary balances are essential in utility, that is to say, they cannot be
zero. However, what is the monetary equilibrium in this figure? Without currency
substitution, that is to say, with agents only using domestic monetary balances for
transaction purposes, and using foreign monetary balances as a store of value, the
monetary equilibrium will be at point B in Figure 7.2.
But when we assume currency substitution, or when agents start using not
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only domestic monetary balances for transaction purposes, but also foreign
monetary balances, the economy will start to move from point B towards point D in
Figure 7.2. However, this movement is only transitory as agents decrease their
foreign monetary balances to increase consumption. This represents a transitory
appreciation of the real exchange rate as we move from point B towards point D
and back to point B, that is to say, domestic inflation will be higher than foreign
inflation, which has been the characteristic of Argentina's situation since the
introduction of the Convertibility Law in 1991.
This is also fully consistent with the aftermaths of the Mexican crisis of late
1994 by which agents proceeded to reduce the money supply by changing their
pesos into dollars with the Central Bank, in the believe that the Argentine
government will produce a nominal devaluation of the exchange rate (which has
been pegged one-to-one to the dollar since 1991). This action is shown in figure 7.2
by a simultaneous shift in the R curve, from R to R' and in the dm = 0 curve, from
ditddm = 0 to dm' = 0. This action by agents shows the lack of control on the part of
dt dt
the government of the domestic money supply, which is constrained by the reserves
held by the Central Bank.
However, the preceding discussion can be appreciated by looking at the
process of accumulation-decumulation of foreign monetary balances. In order to
look at this issue we need to introduce the relationship between consumption and
foreign monetary balances.
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Using equations (7.19) and (7.13) we get two equations in consumption and
foreign monetary balances:
=y - c - nff (7.19)
1 -a
C X -jp =0 (7.15)
Using equation (7.13) to get an equation for c, together with equation (7.15)
we get the following two equations:
S_ c c (+ 1 -®a) c f (7.20)
a a a f
and
.= y-c-7ff (7.19)
Substituting (7.19) into (7.20) we get:
= _ f- c (P +(1 -a) (Y - c - 7t/f) (7.20')
a a a f
Then equations (7.19) and (7.20') generate a dynamic system in c and f.
Since at steady state 1= 0 we get the following:
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2c (P +If) 
_ C2
c f 
- [af a af2 (7.21)
ac of
The determinant of this matrix is:
-___[_ ] 2 <0 (7.22)
af a af 2
The trace is:
2c ] (P-+ nf> 0  (7.23)
af a
which means that the system is saddle path stable.
The slope of the c = 0 line is:
C2  >0
2c -f(p + T)
The slope of the f= 0 line is:
- cf< 0
Graphically we have:
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Figure 7.3
C dc'/dt = 0
A dc/dt=0
df /dt = 0
f
In this case an increase in the rate of growth of domestic money has no
effect on the accumulation-decumulation of foreign monetary balances. However,
let us assume that agents start using foreign monetary balances for transaction
purposes, that is to say, currency substitution starts. What is the effect of this
decision on the economy? The first effect will be given by an upward shift of the
c = 0 line followed by a current account deficit (balance of payments deficit if capital
is not mobile). This current account deficit will have the effect of decumulating
foreign monetary balances, as they are used for transaction purposes, and if foreign
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inflation is positive, it will also increase consumption not only on impact but also on
the new steady state.
Several reasons could be given for this type of behavior on the part of agents
to take place. First, if the growth rate of domestic monetary balances is high, thus
real domestic monetary balances are low, agents may start using foreign monetary
balances so as to conduct economic transactions in the market. Second, if agents
have accumulated sufficient foreign monetary balances during the years, they may
be looking to increase consumption due to the increasing effect of foreign inflation
over their holdings of those foreign monetary balances.
The opposite behavior is also true. If agents decide to increase their foreign
monetary holdings, the c = 0 line will shift to the right creating a current account
surplus and decreasing consumption on impact and on the new steady state to
increase their foreign monetary balances. The interesting issue here is that this
decision on the part of agents is independent from currency substitution. If agents
decide to increase their foreign monetary holdings at some point in time, that does
not mean that currency substitution increases, it only means that agents are
accumulating foreign monetary balances as a store of value, not necessarily as a
medium of exchange. However, as we have seen during this analysis, the opposite
is not true. If agents decide to use their foreign monetary balances for transaction
purposes (i.e., currency substitution), they have to decumulate those balances.
But Figure 7.3 is not the only dynamics of this system. By looking at the
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slope of the c = 0 equation we see that if consumption is very low, the sign of this
slope may be negative. This gives us the dynamics of a "stable locus" by which a
succession of current account deficits and surpluses will set in motion, just as we
showed in Chapter 6 (Figure 6.3, p. 132).
7.4 Conclusion
The parametrization used in this chapter allowed us to simulate the case of
Argentina in which domestic monetary balances have never lost its characteristic
of being essential in utility by which rational, speculative hyperinflations, have to be
ruled out. At the same time it allowed us to differentiate between the process of
dollarization and currency substitution as two different phenomena, although
related.
We showed also that there is an asymmetry between the two processes.
While currency substitution implied a process of decumulation of foreign monetary
balances, accumulation of foreign monetary balances does not necessarily implied
currency substitution.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSIONS AND
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
8.1 CONCLUSIONS
We conclude this dissertation with the firm believe that rational hyperinflations are
not possible in Argentina as long as the domestic currency remains to be essential
in utiltiy. However, the second strand of hyperinflation is ever more possible as the
Argentine governmen increases the rate of growth of the domestic money supply.
In so far as it is the legal tender for conducting economic transactions within the
country, it is extremely difficult that domestic monetary balances could loose this
characteristic.
Even if private agents use the foreign currency to conduct economic
transactions, there are still basic transactions that must be conducted using the
domestic currency. Furthermore, during the hyperinflationary periods of 1989 and
1990, the domestic currency was even more essential that what it is today. The
reason is that up until 1991 all public utility and a big portion of the goods and
service industry such as telephones, trains, water, natural gas,airlines, electricity,
etc., were in the hands of the government and agents had to use the domestic
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currency to settle debts.
Nowadays this has changed, and private agents can conduct transactions
using the domestic or the foreign currency. However, there are still some
transactions, such as public employees salaries and tax payments that must be
conducted using the domestic currency.
Another argument put forward to show that the domestic currency was still
essential in Argentina was the fact that not everybody in society was able to hoard
foreign monetary balances, be it because of being low income individuals or
because of lack of integration (geographical or otherwise) of the financial system.
We also showed that the distiction between cooperant and non-cooperant
monetary balances is intimately related to the dollarization process (specifically with
the decumulation-accumulation of dollars) and less so with the decission to use or
not the foreign money to conduct transactions, that is to say, with currency
substitution per se.
One of the characteristics of the period after the imposition of the
Convertivility Law of 1991 has been that the domestic inflation rate has been higher
than the dollar inflation rate. This was shown to be a consequence of the currency
substitution phenomenon, that is to say, if currency substitution exists, the domestic
inflation rate will be higher than the foreign inflation rate, even with a fixed growth
of the domestic currency.
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8.2 WHAT LIES AHEAD? POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Argentina's economic problems are not easily solved, however, solutions are
intimately and directly related to its political system and furthermore, to its political
culture. If the policy of fixing the exchange rate to the dollar and putting the fiscal
house in order is just the policy chosen only by the Peronist government, and
depends on the continuity of President Menem and Finance Minister Cavallo, then
the future does not look bright.
Efforts to modernize the political system have run short and have been
extremely costly in political terms. The 1994 Constitutional Reform ran short in our
opinion on several grounds.' Two of the most important aspects are the following.
The first one is itself a political argument. This is the fact that in Argentina, voting
is not only a right in itself but it is also an obligation. That means that people have
to vote even if they are not interested in voting or if they are not fully informed about
the alternatives available.2 It is true, however, that people could vote in blank, that
is to say, people go to vote but their vote does not count. However, data on blank
votes shows that this type of voting expression is negligible. This issue is also
'We are leaving out the issue that has to do with reforming the legal and
judiciary institutions because it will need a full dissertation on its own.
2This issue has been discussed by the author and Political Scientists from
Argentina with agreement on the importance of this issue for the political system.
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related to the difference between political mobilization and institutionalization called
"mass praetorianism."3
The basic idea is that political institutions in Argentina are not well equipped
to handle such a large political mobilization. This has provided well-organized
institutions, such as the military sector in Argentina, the opportunity to get a handle
on the political system arguing political disintegration of the country, or at least
using this as an excuse to take over political power.
This argument is linked to our second issue, which relates to the
maintenance of a fixed parity between the peso and the dollar but without fully
dollarizing the economy. On the other hand, several authors have argued that
Argentina should follow Chile, Colombia, and Mexico in establishing a crawling-peg
exchange rate in order to minimize the overvaluation of the domestic currency due
to stubborn inflationary expectations. However, the differences between the political
systems in these later countries and Argentina are at the heart of our opposition to
the implementation of a crawling-peg exchange rate system in Argentina. Chile,
Colombia, and Mexico4 have been able to maintain very closed political systems.
That is to say, they have been more successful than the Argentine political system
to avoid this "mass praetorianism" by which the political mobilization of their masses
3See again Huntington (1968). See also footnote 8 on Chapter 2 of this
Dissertation on page 56.
4Although Mexico's political system is currently in crisis and it will probably
collapse with yet unknown consequences for its future. See Aleman (1993).
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has out paced its institutionalization. However, these countries are not out of the
risks of a break down of their political system. Complicating this issue even further
is the fact that their military sectors are still the backbone of their political
"stability."5
The second issue then, and a much more conflictive one, is the lost
opportunity to make the Convertibility Law of 1991 as a part of the Constitutional
Reform. This could have been done at least until the political institutions were
credible enough, and rational enough to understand the need to pursue and follow
sound economic policy, even at the expense of slowing down the rate of growth of
the economy, which has been very high in these last four years, in order to provide
continuity and stability in the long-run.
The need for the above argument has to do with the issue that this is not the
first time in history that the Argentine government has used the supply of money in
order to finance fiscal deficits. In fact, this policy goes as far as the beginnings of
the country as a Republic when each provincial government had power to print
their own currency. This lack of concern for having a sound currency developed in
one of the biggest financial crisis of the 19th. Century called the Baring Panic of
1890 and 1891.
5We should also include Peru in this group, which has a "pseudo-military-
democratic" government.
6While writing this chapter, Baring Brothers of London has filed for
bankruptcy in Great Britain, due to another bad investment policy, this time
investing in high risk derivatives.
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Williams (1920) wrote about Argentina's economic and monetary policy
during the period of 1885 to 1900 in the following way: "Through it all, paper was
inconvertible and depreciated. It consists of a period of inflation and speculation
culminating in the Baring Panic of 1890 and 1891, and of a subsequent nine or ten
years of depression and very slow recovery. It ends with the Conversion Law of
1899, the act famous in Argentine history for having furnished at last a stable basis
for the currency. From that time on the problem of a fluctuating premium on gold
disappears." (Williams 1920, p. 23)
During those years, and due to the lack of integration to the world financial
markets, individuals were not able to substitute their domestic currency balances
for a strong currency, but nowadays, currency substitution, or the possibility of it,
is perhaps, the only instrument that agents have to avoid unsound monetary
policies and to pressure the government to commit to sound monetary policy and
discipline.
This is even much more important when, as we have been arguing, full
dollarization is a second best alternative due to the costs in terms of seigniorage
paid to the U.S. government for holding dollars, and due to the trade-off between
consumption and foreign monetary holdings.
The government, through the Convertibility Law of 1991, has been able to
increase the monetary base as economic growth has increased (one dollar in
reserve for each peso put into circulation), thus increasing seigniorage. This has
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been achieved by increasing foreign reserves available at the Central Bank.
However, this increase in Central Bank reserves is probably the result of the selling
off of state owned enterprises because the current account has been in deficit since
the end of 1991. That is to say, once the government finishes the process of
privatization, reserves would not be flowing in unless there is a reversal of this huge
current account deficit. At the same time, the government has been having
problems in order to maintain the fiscal superavit it had for the last two to three
years.
Our argument in favor of a probably temporary, Convertibility Law as a part
of a Constitutional Reform is directly linked to the credibility issue, so crucial for
Argentina's political institutions. This is directly related to what is called a "Decreto
de Necesidad y Urgencia" (roughly translated as an Emergency Decree, similar to
an Executive Decree recently used by President Clinton to bail out the Mexican
Economy) by which President Menem has assumed legislative powers in cases that
he deemed necessary. President Menem has used this mechanism 330 times since
he became president of Argentina in 1989 according to Delia Ferreira Rubio and
Matteo Goretti.7 This would not be a problem probably if there was an independent
judicial system, but this is not so in Argentina.
So, theoretically, there exist a real possibility that whenever necessary, the
7See Delia Ferreira Rubio and Matteo Goretti (1994) for a complete
discussion on this important issue.
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president will use an Executive Decree to derogate the Convertibility Law of 1991.
Ecuador tried this path toward improving the credibility of its economic decision by
making their Convertibility Law an integral part of its Constitution and then
derogated it through a governmental decree. Therefore, there are no guarantees
that this would stand either. Then, it all boils down to Fischer's (1982) conclusion
that "there is no absolutely guaranteed way of providing discipline for governments
determined to avoid it." (Fischer 1982, p. 300)
He further concludes that "in those countries where dollarization is observed,
it is usually the response to a government out of control rather than one setting the
inflation rate on the basis of a careful optimizing analysis. Under such
circumstances, use of a foreign money appears to provide a useful discipline on the
monetary authority. But the system carries the seeds of its own destruction, since
the value of the outstanding stock of currency is a seigniorage incentive to the
government which introduces a domestic currency." (Fischer 1982, p. 307)
This conclusion supports our long held argument that, at least in the case of
Argentina, currency substitution is not a choice on the part of the government to
reduce inflation but the choice of each individual agent to avoid non-optimal
inflation rate policies on the part of the Argentine government.
Credibility can also be improved by a further integration of Argentina into
NAFTA, which will play a key role in setting the stage for having "lenders of last
resort," such as the Federal Reserve System of the United States that will probably,
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just as it was done with Mexico recently, step in if faced with the possibility of a
collapse of the system.
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